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The Unintended Federalism 
Consequences of the Affordable 
Care Act’s Insurance Market 
Reforms 
 
Joshua Phares Ackerman* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
After the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) in 2010, the front lines in the political 
controversy over the Act shifted from Washington to the 
states.1 One of the ACA’s signature provisions was the creation 
of health insurance marketplaces, termed “exchanges,” that 
consumers can use to purchase coverage under the Act.2 Under 
the banner of “state flexibility,” the ACA delegated authority to 
set up and administer the exchanges to the states.3 The federal 
government, however, is responsible for operating an exchange 
in any state that does not create one of its own.4 The states’ 
role in creating exchanges provided a focal point for continued 
political wrangling over the Act. Resisting the creation of an 
exchange in their state became a cause célèbre among 
Republican governors, who denounced the exchanges as an 
encroachment on states’ rights.5 While refusing to set up an 
 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul J. Watford, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I am grateful to thank Rich Chen, John Major, 
Anup Malani, Garett Rose, Graham Safty, and Julia Schwartz for their 
helpful advice and comments on drafts of this Article. I would also like to 
thank the editorial staff of the PACE LAW REVIEW for their work on this piece. 
1. But see 40th Repeal Vote Unlikely To Be Charm for House 
Republicans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2013/August/02/house-
repeal-vote.aspx. 
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012). 
3. See id. 
4. Id. § 18041(c). 
5. See Robert Pear, Majority of Governors Refuse to Set Up Health 
1
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exchange may have political benefits, it also has a significant 
impact on states’ regulatory authority under the ACA. Put 
simply, those who opposed the creation of state exchanges as a 
means of protesting the expansion of federal government may 
have won a battle at the expense of losing a much larger war 
over the scope of federal authority. 
For the most part, the controversy over the exchanges 
broke along predictable partisan lines. But in Mississippi, the 
decision whether to create a state-run exchange bitterly 
divided the state’s governor and insurance commissioner, both 
of whom are Republicans. Like many of his GOP colleagues, 
Governor Phil Bryant opposed the creation of an ACA 
exchange, arguing that it would be “a portal to a massive and 
unaffordable new federal entitlement program.”6 However, 
Mike Chaney, the state’s elected insurance commissioner, 
supported the creation of an exchange. Claiming that the 
Governor was “full of crap,” Chaney argued that a state-run 
exchange would allow Mississippi to maintain control over 
health plan regulation.7 In Chaney’s view, a federally run 
exchange would impede the state’s control over plan pricing, 
selection, and distribution.8 Believing that he had authority 
under state law to move forward independently, Chaney 
submitted a plan for an exchange to the Department of Health 
and Human Services (“HHS”).9 Governor Bryant wrote 
 
Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A13; Louise Radnofsky, Six More 
States Reject Role In Health-Care Exchanges, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432004578306680100309
950.html?mod=mw_streaming_stream#articleTabs%3Darticle. 
6. Governor Bryant Issues Statement on Health Care Exchange, 
GOVERNOR PHIL BRYANT (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.governorbryant.com/governor-bryant-issues-statement-on-health-
care-exchange/. 
7. Geoff Pender, Mississippi Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney 
Virtually Alone, Miffed, CLARION-LEDGER (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.clarionledger.com/article/20130120/COL0601/301200032/. 
8. See Louise Radnofsky, State’s Health Exchange Rejected Amid GOP 
Rift, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873249060045782922712
69356316; see also Caleb Bedillion, Chaney Outlines Health Care Future, 
DAILYLEADER.COM (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:15 PM) (source on file with the author). 
9. Chaney relied on an opinion from the state’s attorney general (a 
Democrat) that concluded he had authority to submit the exchange 
application. See Radnofsky, supra note 8. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
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separately to HHS, stating that he was opposed to a state-run 
exchange and would take steps to block it if HHS approved 
Chaney’s application.10 HHS denied Chaney’s application, 
citing “a lack of support from your Governor and no formal 
commitment to coordinate from other state agencies” as the 
basis of its decision.11 Chaney continues to maintain that the 
federal exchange will be detrimental to the state, and that 
Governor Bryant’s opposition to the exchange was rooted in 
political, rather than policy, considerations.12 
The family feud in the Mississippi GOP highlights an 
unintended—and unexplored—consequence of federal health 
reform. On their face, the exchange provisions of the ACA 
purport to give states options. By allowing states to determine 
whether to establish an exchange and how it should be run, the 
Act vests a degree of control over the implementation of health 
reform in the states. This delegation stands in contrast with 
other provisions of the ACA, which impose federal standards in 
areas traditionally subject to state regulatory authority.13 The 
exchange provision seems an ideal compromise—states may 
elect to establish an exchange under their own terms, or opt 
into a set of federal default rules if they see fit. By this account, 
the exchanges are a pro-federalism aspect of the ACA, in that 
they preserve a prominent role for the states in regulating a 
crucial component of federal health reform. 
Developments since the passage of the ACA have cast 
considerable doubt on this characterization of the exchanges as 
protective of state regulatory authority. The exchanges have 
become a political hot potato to be avoided by Republican 
governors (and some of their Democratic counterparts) at all 
 
10. See id. 
11. Press Release, Mississippi Insurance Department, Official Statement 
from Mississippi Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney (Feb. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.mid.ms.gov/press_releases/2013/pressrel020813.pdf 
(reproducing letter from Gary Cohen, Director of HHS Center for Consumer 
Information and Insurance Oversight, to Chaney). 
12. See Bedillion, supra note 8. 
13. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2012) (prohibiting rescission of health 
insurance policies); id. § 300gg-15 (preempting state disclosure requirements 
that conflict with the ACA’s disclosure requirements); id. § 300gg-16 
(prohibiting the use of employee salary as an eligibility criterion for joining a 
group health plan). 
3
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costs. Only twenty-four states (and the District of Columbia) 
opted to create exchanges, leaving the other twenty-six states 
with some form of a federal exchange.14 
This political opposition to the exchanges comes at a 
significant cost. Much of the ACA’s substantive regulation of 
health insurance plans is tied to rules set and administered by 
the exchanges; by opting not to create state-run exchanges, 
states have ceded the ability to set these rules to the federal 
government. Thus, by accident or by design, a provision that 
purports to preserve a role for state regulation has stripped 
states of a significant portion of their traditional prerogative to 
regulate health insurance within their borders. 
This Article, which is the first to examine the relationship 
between the ACA’s insurance market reforms and state 
regulation of insurance, argues that states’ decisions to forego 
creating their own exchanges may mark the beginning of an 
important shift of regulatory authority from the states to the 
federal government. This shift will have broad consequences in 
health care, effectively creating a new federal regulator with 
authority to specify the products health insurers may sell, how 
they may sell them, who must be able to purchase them, and 
what they may charge. 
Such a shift to greater federal regulation is a mistake. 
State-based regulation of health insurance has a number of 
advantages over a federal alternative. It provides greater 
opportunity for regulatory experimentation, which is critical 
given the lack of consensus regarding how best to solve the 
cost-access-quality tradeoffs that plague American health care. 
Moreover, health care is a local industry. A great deal depends 
on the interaction between providers and insurers within a 
local market, and state regulators are better suited to regulate 
with sensitivity to these dynamics. State regulators also have 
 
14. See What is the Marketplace in my State?, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-is-the-marketplace-in-my-state/ (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2014), for information on which states opted to create exchanges. Of 
the states that elected to create an exchange, fifteen opted to share some of 
the responsibility for operating their exchange with the federal government. 
See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE ACT: STATUS OF CMS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH 
FEDERALLY FACILITATED HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 3, 9-10, 14-15 (2013), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655291.pdf. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
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superior institutional expertise in insurance regulation. At the 
very least, it would be unwise to jettison state regulation, and 
its accompanying benefits, without considering whether a 
federal alternative would be superior. But the ACA’s exchange 
provisions will result in exactly this sort of blindfolded 
transformation. 
The shift toward an increased federal role in health 
insurance regulation may also have consequences beyond 
health care markets. Specifically, it may open the door to 
greater federal involvement in insurance regulation generally. 
In recent years, insurance companies and scholars have begun 
to question the States’ decades-old allocation role as the 
primary regulators of insurance. Some have proposed creating 
an alternative scheme based on federal chartering of insurance 
carriers. These proposals have touched off a broader debate 
about the propriety of state-based insurance regulation.15 The 
federal exchange may be a test run of sorts for such a program, 
and if it overcomes its initial hiccups,16 could generate further 
momentum for federal chartering. But proponents of regulatory 
reform in non-health insurance markets should not rush to 
trumpet the ACA as a model regulatory structure. As the result 
of states’ unexpected reaction to the exchange provisions, the 
ACA’s allotment of regulatory authority is haphazard, and not 
the product of deliberative institutional design. Any reform in 
other markets should be informed by a debate—which was 
sorely lacking in the ACA context—about the pros and cons of 
federal regulation. 
The Article begins by sketching the historical antecedents 
 
15. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of Insurance Regulation, 
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 18-20 (1993) (arguing that the basic structure of 
insurance regulation is sound, and proposing modest reforms); Susan 
Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism 
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 625, 664-69, 686-87 (1999) (arguing that traditional federalism 
arguments do not justify state regulation of insurance); Daniel Schwarcz, 
Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against 
Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1708-11, 1716-
17 (2010) (discussing proposals to reform insurance regulation, and arguing 
that proponents of reform overstate the benefits of regulatory competition). 
16. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Ian Austen, & Sharon LaFraniere, Tension and 
Flaws Before Health Website Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, at A1. 
5
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of the current allocation of state and federal authority over 
insurance regulation. The aim of this discussion is to highlight 
the unique role states play in the regulation of insurance as 
opposed to other financial products. Part III explains the pre-
ACA structure of health insurance regulation. It discusses both 
the objectives of health insurance regulation and the 
substantive and institutional frameworks states have evolved 
to meet those objectives. Part III also explains the reasons why 
states are well suited to regulate health insurance. Before 
turning to the regulatory structure introduced by President 
Obama’s health reforms, Part IV explains the federal 
government’s involvement in health plan regulation before the 
ACA. Part V details the relevant ACA provisions, explaining 
the new rules that will apply to health plans and carriers. It 
pays special attention to the application of these rules—some 
apply to all health plans, regardless of how they are sold, while 
others apply only to plans sold through the exchanges. These 
latter rules are particularly important to this Article’s analysis, 
as they represent the regulatory functions that the federal 
government will assume—via its exchange—in states that elect 
not to create exchanges. Part VI explores the effect the ACA’s 
exchange rules will have on the balance of state and federal 
regulatory authority, and highlights how the opt-in character 
of the exchanges will alter this balance. Lastly, it offers 
observations about the impact increased federal regulation of 
health insurance may have on the regulation of other lines of 
insurance. 
 
II. Insurance Regulation as a Core State Competency 
 
Insurance is unique among financial services industries in 
that it is the only industry subject to plenary state regulation.17 
Other financial services firms, including commercial banks, 
investment banks, securities firms, and broker-dealers are all 
subject to some form of federal regulatory authority. This Part 
first explains the historical development of states’ role as the 
primary regulator of the insurance. It then turns to a 
 
17. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, COSTLY POLICIES: STATE 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 1 (1993). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
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discussion of the competencies state regulators have developed 
in this capacity. 
 
A. Insurance Regulation and the States: A Brief History 
 
The states’ role in insurance regulation is rooted in the 
Supreme Court’s historical interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause. The insurance business was originally a local concern. 
The first firms to offer insurance policies were local and 
regional fire and life carriers, which were often formed as local 
stock companies or associations set up for the purpose of 
providing mutual protection for their members.18 As one would 
expect, these local entities were chartered by state 
governments. 
As the business expanded and carriers began to operate 
across state lines, these local licensing regimes became a 
subject of dispute. In Paul v. Virginia, the Supreme Court 
considered a challenge to Virginia’s licensure regime brought 
by an out-of-state individual who wished to operate as an 
insurance broker in Virginia.19 Paul, the plaintiff, challenged 
Virginia’s decision not to allow him to operate in the state even 
though he complied with all of its regulatory requirements 
except a bond deposit provision.20 The Court held that 
insurance contracts—which were the objects of the state 
regulations—were not articles of interstate commerce, and that 
the dormant Commerce Clause therefore did not limit state 
authority over them.21 Thus, insurance contracts were within 
the states’ exclusive control, and states were accordingly free to 
use this power to regulate the business of insurance as they 
saw fit. This understanding of insurance contracts as a state 
 
18. See Robert W. Klein, The Insurance Industry and Its Regulation: An 
Overview, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
13, 13-16 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009). 
19. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 168-69 (1869). 
20. Id. at 169. 
21. Id. at 183. A second strand of the Court’s holding related to the 
constitutional protections owed to corporations. The Court held that 
corporations are not citizens for constitutional purposes, and that states were 
therefore free to set licensing conditions as they saw fit. See id. at 177, 181. 
7
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concern persisted for nearly a century.22 
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in United States v. 
South-Eastern Underwriters Association.23 That case arose 
from an indictment filed against South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association (“South-Eastern”) alleging violations of the 
Sherman Act. The indictment charged that the association had 
engaged in conspiracies in restraint of trade and attempted 
monopolization.24 South-Eastern’s only defense was that it was 
not subject to the Sherman Act because its business—
insurance—was not “trade or commerce” among the states.25 
South-Eastern argued that the entire business of insurance, 
including interstate transactions, was beyond the reach of the 
Commerce Clause and, therefore, the Sherman Act.26 
South-Eastern’s argument forced the Court to squarely 
confront—for the first time—whether Congress had the 
authority to regulate interstate insurance transactions. The 
Court characterized the prior cases on the subject, including 
Paul, as dealing with the related but distinct question of 
whether the Dormant Commerce Clause permitted the states to 
regulate interstate insurance transactions.27 The Court held 
that the regulation of interstate insurance contracts was within 
the scope of the Commerce Clause power and that the Sherman 
Act applied to the insurance industry.28 
South-Eastern Underwriters threatened the structure of 
insurance regulation that had prevailed for nearly a century. 
In response to the decision, Congress quickly passed the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which substantially returned the 
allocation of regulatory authority to the pre-South-Eastern 
 
22. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Cnty., 231 U.S. 495 (1913), aff’g 
Paul, 75 U.S. 168; Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), aff’g Paul, 75 
U.S. 168. 
23. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
24. See id. at 534-35 (summarizing the claims under sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act). In an interesting twist, the indictment alleged that the 
terms of the conspiracies were “policed,” i.e., enforced, “by inspection and 
rating bureaus in five . . . states, together with local boards of insurance 
agents.” Id. at 536. 
25. Id. at 536. 
26. See id. at 537-38. 
27. See id. at 544-45. 
28. See id. at 553, 561. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
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Underwriters status quo.29 The Act reflected Congress’ 
judgment that the regulation of insurance should remain with 
the states: “[T]he continued regulation and taxation by the 
several States of the business of insurance is in the public 
interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall not be 
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of 
such businesses by the several States.”30 In support of this 
judgment, the Act contained a unique reverse-preemption 
provision that nullifies federal statutes insofar as they conflict 
with state regulations.31 The basic structure put in place by 
McCarran-Ferguson persists to this day. Although Congress 
has removed some powers from the states,32 the vast majority 
of insurance regulation is state imposed. 
 
B. State Insurance Regulation Competencies 
 
State insurance regulations exhibit considerable breadth 
and complexity. Generally speaking, however, the regulations 
fit into three broad categories—solvency, rate regulation, and 
market conduct. A brief summary of the types of regulations 
states impose in these areas, as well as their justifications, is 
useful to set the stage for an exploration of health-insurance-
specific regulations. 
Protecting the insured public from the risks posed by 
insolvent insurers was one of the earliest state interventions 
into the insurance business, and the motivating force behind 
the creation of state insurance regulators.33 The need for 
 
29. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 17, at 12; JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, 
REGULATING THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 27 (2010); see 
also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946) (“Obviously 
Congress’ purpose [in passing McCarran-Ferguson] was broadly to give 
support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the 
business of insurance.”). 
30. McCarran-Ferguson Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
31. Id. § 1012(b). 
32. For examples of where Congress has increased federal regulatory 
authority over health insurance, see infra Part IV. 
33. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 168 (1869) (discussing Virginia’s 
solvency regulations); EDWIN WILHITE PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PRACTICE 192 (1927). 
9
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solvency regulation is clear. Because they have no personal 
assets at risk, insurance company managers may not be 
properly incentivized to ensure that the carrier’s financial 
reserves are sufficient to pay out any claims that members may 
make.34 Put differently, managers will be tempted to draw on 
the carrier’s financial reserves to cover their own salaries and 
perquisites, which may risk the carrier’s ability to fulfill its 
policy commitments. Consumers, for their part, have little 
means of scrutinizing the solvency of different carriers.35 By 
the time there is a readily observable solvency problem with a 
carrier, it may be too late for consumers to arrange alternate 
coverage. Thus, state solvency standards both reduce the 
incentive difficulty and counter the information asymmetry 
faced by consumers. 
Solvency is regulated by the carrier’s state of domicile.36 
Typically, states require that carriers hold specified amounts of 
fixed and risk-based capital, and regulate the kinds of 
investments carriers may make.37 These regulations, however, 
do not appear to be especially burdensome—carriers tend to 
maintain capitalization levels well above regulatory 
minimums.38 As a backstop in the event of a carrier’s failure, 
states also maintain guaranty associations designed to honor 
the claims of insolvent carriers.39 
Rate regulation is the second major area of state insurance 
 
34. See Klein, supra note 18, at 27. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. at 39. States vary considerably in terms of the relative 
proportion of in-state business that is written by carriers domiciled in other 
states. See id. at 20, 25 (reporting data on the percentage of each state’s 
property-casualty and life-health premiums written by out-of-state carriers). 
Other states may provide supplemental requirements beyond those required 
by the carrier’s state of domicile. Echoing the debate from the corporate 
chartering context, some have argued that the domicile system has 
precipitated a regulatory race to the bottom. See id. at 39. Note that some 
commentators have suggested that carrier solvency regulation is motivated in 
part by fear of panics that resemble those in other financial industries. It is 
not clear, however, that the business of insurance poses the same risk of 
panic found in other financial industries like banking. See id. 
37. See id. at 39. 
38. See id. at 18-19 & n.12. 
39. See id. at 40. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
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oversight.40 Interestingly, rate regulation also began as a 
solvency measure.41 Rate regulation works in tandem with 
solvency regulation, as it ensures that carriers charge 
premiums sufficient to cover their policy commitments.42 
Today, many states also use rate regulation as a means of 
ensuring access to coverage—rate review allows carriers to 
make sure that rates are not “too high” and do not 
unacceptably discriminate between consumers.43 Although the 
justifications for rate regulation are disputed,44 proponents of 
these regulations defend them on the ground that free market 
price competition does not function properly in the insurance 
industry because consumer search costs are high.45 The 
stringency of rate regulation, which generally involves the 
definition of permissible rating factors (i.e., the variables that 
carriers may use to price their products) and direct state 
review of the actual rates charged by plans—tends to vary with 
the sophistication of the buyer.46 Accordingly, rate regulation in 
some markets, like the market for individual health insurance, 
is much more stringent than in others, such as the market for 
commercial liability policies. 
The third major area of state insurance regulation relates 
to the market conduct of insurers. Rules in this area encompass 
the approval of policy forms and terms, restrictions on 
marketing content, and claims processing and adjustment.47 
Importantly, these regulations also insurance agents and 
brokers, which are an important distribution channel.48 The 
justifications for market-conduct regulation are familiar. The 
 
40. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state rate 
regulations in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914). 
41. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 639 (2d ed. 2008). 
42. See id.; see also Klein, supra note 18, at 28-29. 
43. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 23. 
44. See Robert E. Litan & Phil O’Connor, Consumer Benefits of an 
Optional Federal Charter: The Case of Auto Insurance, in THE FUTURE OF 
INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 145, 148-62 
(assessing the impact of certain states’ rate deregulation programs on 
consumers). 
45. See Klein, supra note 18, at 29. 
46. See id. at 40-41. 
47. See Klein, supra note 18, at 30. 
48. See id. at 41. 
11
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regulations are intended to counter the effects of information 
asymmetries, consumer financial illiteracy, and the superior 
bargaining position of carriers.49 
To summarize, more than 150 years of state insurance 
regulation has left states with a set of core regulatory 
competencies that apply, generally speaking, across all lines of 
insurance. Over roughly the past sixty years, these core 
regulatory functions have been adapted and applied to the 
special problems posed by health insurance. The next Part 
explores these health-specific regulations. 
 
III. State Health Insurance and HMO Regulation before the 
ACA 
 
States have taken the lead role in regulating health 
insurance plans since they became common in the 1930s. From 
the outset, state regulation of health plans has sought to 
balance the competing aims of making health coverage 
affordable and ensuring that it is widely available—even to 
those whose health status makes them expensive to insure. 
Achieving these aims is not a straightforward task. Over time, 
states have developed rules that regulate nearly every aspect of 
the health insurance business, from the pricing of plans, to how 
they may be sold, to what they must contain. The tapestry of 
state regulations shows that while states agree on the basic 
mechanisms used to regulate plans, they disagree as to 
precisely how much regulation is required to create acceptable 
health plan markets. 
This Part highlights, in broad terms, the depth and 
diversity of state health plan regulation. The goal is not to 
provide a comprehensive description of the regulatory 
landscape, but rather to highlight the intricacy and diversity of 
state regimes. It is important to understand the regulatory 
diversity in this area, because it represents precisely what is 
 
49. See id. at 30 (discussing these problems in the context of property, 
life, and casualty insurance); see also Patricia A. Butler, The Current Status 
of State and Federal Regulation, in REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY, 
PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS 29, 32-33 (Stuart H. Altman, Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, & David Schactman eds., 1999) (discussing these issues in the 
health insurance context). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
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valuable about a state-based regulatory system. It encourages 
regulatory experimentation, which is particularly useful in the 
health insurance context because of the zero-sum tradeoff 
between cost, quality of care, and access to care. And it affords 
both carriers and consumers a degree of choice. Carriers can 
choose not to do business in states with overly burdensome 
regulatory schemes. Consumers also benefit, in that it is much 
easier to influence local regulators’ actions than to influence 
national health care policy. As subsequent parts of the Article 
make clear, the ACA threatens this diversity. 
The discussion in this Part begins with a brief history of 
the development of health insurance and early state regulatory 
approaches. It then explains the institutional structure of state 
health plan regulation before turning to the substance of the 
regulations themselves. It concludes with a brief discussion of 
the merits of state-based regulation. 
 
A. The Emergence of Health Insurance and Its Early 
Regulation 
 
Health insurance is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was 
unusual before 1930, and only became widespread after World 
War II.50 Accordingly, the regulatory regime governing other 
lines of insurance was in place well before health insurance 
became a significant regulatory concern.51 As is the case with 
 
50. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION 
AND FINANCE 195-96 (4th ed. 2001). In the early 1930s, health care costs 
began to rise significantly in response to improvements in care quality and 
increasing physician market power. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 258-60, 295 (1982). Significantly, 
these cost increases did not affect all patients equally. See id. at 259-60. 
Those who faced hospitalization or other serious illnesses faced significant 
expenses, sometimes amounting to 30 to 50 percent of their annual income. 
See id. at 260. Those in better health, however, incurred only a fraction of 
this cost. Health insurance offered a solution to this high variation in 
expenses by providing a means to spread the risk of health care costs across 
the population. See id. at 258-60. 
51. The development of health insurance lagged that of other forms of 
insurance partly because of the high costs, adverse selection, and significant 
moral hazards associated with health insurance. See STARR, supra note 50, at 
294. Carriers partially solved these problems by moving to a model of 
employer enrollment, which allowed them to secure a larger risk pool. See id. 
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other insurance products, the structure of health insurance 
regulation is in part a function of the product’s historical 
development. Early health insurance plans closely resembled 
traditional forms of indemnity insurance—consumers would 
pay a premium in exchange for a promise that the carrier 
would reimburse them for certain expenses.52 In these early 
plans, carriers exercised no oversight over consumers’ decisions 
to seek care, and did not contract directly with providers.53 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their similarity to other lines of 
insurance, states regulated these early plans much like other 
indemnity products.54 
This early regulatory regime distinguished between Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield plans—which were hospital-sponsored 
and physician-sponsored health plans—and plans offered by 
commercial health insurers.55 This distinction reflected 
differences in the way these entities initially priced their 
products; the “Blues” plans used community rating,56 while 
commercial carriers used experience rating.57 This 
classification persists, in varying forms, in some modern state 
regulatory regimes.58 
During the 1970s, a new form of health insurance 
 
52. 3 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:7 (2010); see STARR, 
supra note 50, at 291-92. 
53. See STARR, supra note 50, at 291. 
54. See id. at 297 (discussing New York’s decision to regulate hospital 
service plans like insurers). 
55. See id. at 297, 306-07 (discussing Blue Cross plans’ efforts to secure 
exemption from general insurance regulations like reserve requirements, and 
the emergence of physician-led Blue Shield plans in response to restrictive 
state regulation of cooperative health plans). 
56. Community-rated policies are priced based on the expected claims of 
the entire pool of those insured. See id. at 329. Experience-rated policies are 
priced based on the claims (actual or expected) of each individual member of 
the risk pool. See id. 
57. FURROW ET AL., supra note 50, at 195-96. Under this regime, the 
Blues plans received more favorable regulatory treatment, but were subject 
to special rules of incorporation that limited their activities. See id.; see also 
STARR, supra note 50, at 298, 328-29 (cataloging the spread of Blues-specific 
regulation, and describing its effect on the Blues’ ability to compete with 
commercial carriers). Note that by the end of the 1950s, Blues plans had also 
begun to use experience rating. See STARR, supra note 50, at 330. 
58. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1201 (West 2013) (exempting 
“nonprofit health care corporations” from general insurance laws as part of a 
separate regulatory scheme applicable to these entities). 
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emerged. Health maintenance organizations (“HMOs” or 
“managed care plans”) gained popularity following the passage 
of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.59 The 
economic model of HMO plans differs markedly from that of 
indemnity plans. In an HMO plan, the consumer pays the 
carrier a fixed fee up-front, and the carrier then arranges and 
directly pays for all covered care that patient requires.60 
Importantly, HMO plans perform a number of other functions 
designed to control the cost of the care they provide. First, they 
play a gatekeeping role, often termed “prior authorization.” 
Prior authorization programs require that patients seek the 
plan’s approval before receiving care.61 This reduces the 
significant moral hazard problems that would arise if patients 
could freely consume care at no marginal cost to themselves. 
Second, HMO plans generally maintain a limited network of 
providers. By agreeing to channel their members to these 
providers, the plans are able to secure concessions in the price 
of care.62 The care management functions pioneered by HMOs 
represent the biggest difference between health insurance and 
other forms of insurance, which led some states to create 
separate regulators for health plans. 
 
B. The Institutional Structure of Modern Health Plan 
Regulation 
 
States have adopted different approaches to the 
institutional design question of whether to consolidate the 
regulation of health plans and other forms of insurance in a 
single agency. 
Many states choose to vest regulatory authority over 
 
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-14a (2012); see FURROW ET AL., supra note 
50, at 196. 
60. See Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think about 
“Managed Care”, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 661, 666-75 (1999), for a discussion 
of the relationship between HMOs and other forms of health insurance. 
61. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 627-31 (5th ed. 2004) (explaining various forms of utilization 
controls used by managed care organizations) [hereinafter FURROW ET AL., 
HEALTH LAW]. 
62. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 50, at 198, 201. 
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health plans in the state insurance commissioner.63 Means of 
selecting insurance commissioners vary significantly by state. 
Eleven states elect their insurance commissioners.64 In twenty-
nine states, the insurance commissioner is a gubernatorial 
appointee, and in the remaining states, a subordinate executive 
official or committee chooses the commissioner.65 Some states 
require that insurance commissioners have prior experience in 
the business of insurance.66 The status and importance of 
insurance commissioners relative to other executive branch 
officials also varies by state. There is wide variation in the size 
and budget of state insurance departments.67 
As an alternative to vesting authority to regulate health 
plans with the insurance commissioner, some states have a 
separate agency charged with this responsibility.68 Usually 
called departments of managed care or health, the directors of 
 
63. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1405/1405-5 (LexisNexis 2013) 
(granting the insurance commissioner authority to execute and administer all 
laws under chapter 215 of the Illinois code, which includes health insurance 
and HMO regulation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-1-101 (West 2013) (conferring 
“presumed” jurisdiction over “any person or other entity which provides 
coverage . . . for medical . . . expenses, whether such coverage is by direct 
payment, reimbursement, or otherwise” to the State Department of 
Insurance); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 31.002, 843.151 (West 2013) (granting the 
insurance department regulatory authority over the business of insurance 
generally and HMOs specifically). 
64. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 42; see also 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS, 2011 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES REPORT 2 (2012), 
available at http://naic.softlinkliberty.net/liberty/libraryHome.do (search 
“insurance department resources report”). For a summary of the debate about 
the propriety of electing versus appointing insurance commissioners, see 
JUSTIN L. BRADY ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE 65-66 (1995). 
65. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 42; see also BRADY ET AL., supra 
note 64, at 64. 
66. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 31.023 (West 2013). 
67. See BRADY ET AL., supra note 64, at 74-77. 
68. See, e.g., Knox-Keene Health Care Services Plan Act of 1975, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1341, 1345(f) (Deering 2013) (creating the 
Department of Managed Health Care, charged with regulating “[a]ny person 
who undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care services . . . , or to 
pay for or to reimburse any part of the cost for those services, in return for a 
prepaid or periodic charge”); see also 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 991.2102, 
991.2181 (West 2013) (allocating shared authority for the regulation of health 
plans to the Departments of Insurance and Health); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 23-17.13-2 to 23-17.13-4 (West 2013) (conferring authority to regulate 
health plans on the department of health). 
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these departments are appointed officials.69 
 
C. The Substance of State Health Plan Regulation 
 
Health insurance is a heavily regulated industry. States 
impose a wide range of rules and restrictions on insurers’ 
conduct, and even before the ACA, insurers were also subject to 
a number of federal statutes.70 Broadly speaking, state 
regulations of health insurers can be grouped into four 
categories: rules affecting underwriting and rating practices, 
rules governing market conduct, rules regulating the content of 
plans (including coverage requirements, provider contracting 
requirements, and regulation of utilization management 
techniques), and rules applicable to insurance agents and other 
producers. This section will explain the substantive content of 
each of these sets of state regulations, drawing on the regimes 
of several states as examples. 
 
1. Health Plan Regulation and Group Size 
 
State regulation of health plans varies by the size of the 
insured group.71 State rating regulation, for example, is most 
stringent in the market for “small-group” and individual health 
plans. Small-group plans are typically defined as those offered 
to employers with between two and fifty enrolled employees.72 
Individual plans are those available for purchase directly by 
consumers, and offer coverage only for an individual and his or 
her family. 
There are a number of reasons why states regulate the 
small-group and individual markets more stringently. First, 
because small groups have fewer members, it is more difficult 
 
69. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1341; 71 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 67.1. 
70. See infra Part IV. 
71. Since most health insurance plans are employer provided, groups are 
typically composed of a given employer’s employees. 
72. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357(l)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38a-564(4) (West 2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/351B-3 (West 
2013); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 31-101(z)(1) (West 2013); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. 
§ 1501.002(14) (West 2013). 
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for carriers to spread the risk of loss across the group. One 
chronically ill employee can incur significant enough medical 
expenses so as to make the entire employee group unprofitable 
for the carrier. Accordingly, left to their own devices, carriers 
would have a very strong incentive to aggressively price 
discriminate between small groups. Doing so would allow them 
to charge sicker employees more than their peers, or, perhaps 
more likely, perhaps setting rates so high as to make coverage 
unaffordable for the group. 
A similar dynamic is present in the individual market. If 
carriers were to price their individual health plans to 
accurately reflect the health risk of each potential purchaser, 
many individuals would be excluded from the market. Carriers 
would have no reason to offer an affordable plan to a sick 
individual, preferring instead to focus on healthier consumers. 
Accordingly, state regulations in the individual market attempt 
to force carriers to distribute health risks across the entire pool 
of individual policyholders as a means of facilitating access. In 
sum, in both the small-group and the individual markets, 
allowing carriers to rate their products as they wish would 
have an adverse effect on access to health coverage,73 and most 
states have thus intervened to prevent this outcome.74 
A second reason state regulation is more stringent in the 
small-group context is that federal law effectively preempts 
state regulation of larger group plans. Once a group reaches a 
certain size—typically around 250 members—it becomes 
economical for the group to self-insure.75 Self-insuring 
employers simply collect premiums from their employees, and 
pay for losses with corporate funds. These employers generally 
contract with an insurance carrier or a third-party 
administrator to provide claims processing and other services, 
 
73. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 50, at 261. 
74. Note that not all states have imposed rating restrictions, and the 
content of the restrictions varies considerably from state-to-state. See infra 
note 93. 
75. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. ET AL., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2012 
ANNUAL SURVEY 167 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-employer-
health-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (reporting that 81 percent 
of firms with more than two hundred employees are at least partially self-
insured). 
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and may contract with an insurance carrier to provide coverage 
for catastrophic losses. ERISA preempts state regulation of 
these self-insurance arrangements, effectively clearing states 
from the field.76 
 
2. Restrictions on Rating and Underwriting 
 
States play a significant role in determining the pricing of 
health insurance products through their regulation of rating 
and underwriting. Rating is the process by which an insurance 
carrier assesses the risk involved with issuing a given type of 
policy.77 When rating a policy, the carrier assesses the effect 
that policyholder attributes are likely to have on the medical 
expenses the policyholder is likely to incur. For example, the 
carrier will calculate how much more it is likely to pay in 
claims to cover a sixty-five year old versus a twenty-five year 
old. At the end of the rating process, a carrier’s actuaries will 
have developed a baseline premium for a given policy, along 
with a set of adjustments associated with the specific attributes 
of the policyholder. Underwriting is the process of soliciting 
information about a prospective policyholder, and using this 
information to calculate an individual premium based on those 
rating factors. Together, rating and underwriting establish the 
price of a given policy. 
Virtually every aspect of small-group rating is subject to 
state regulation. Most broadly, many states dictate that 
carriers must use community rating rather than experience 
rating for small-group products.78 That is, carriers must 
calculate the expected losses, and consequently the premium, 
based on the claims experience of all the small groups they 
cover, not based on any one small employer group. This rule 
 
76. See infra Part IV.B. 
77. See PLITT ET AL., supra note 52, at § 1:3. 
78. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.13 (Deering 2013); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-567(5) (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
1205 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-25 (West 2013); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 3231(a)(1) (McKinney 2013); cf. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1501.202 to 
1501.205 (West 2013) (implementing a similar system whereby carriers 
establish a limited number of “classes of business,” not based on group size, 
calculate an “index rate” for each, and then are allowed to charge rates to 
individual groups that vary by a fixed percentage from the index rate). 
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has the effect of spreading claims risk across all employer 
groups enrolled in a given product, rather than only across a 
single employer’s employees.79 Not all states, however, require 
community rating, and the specific rules vary between the 
states that do.80 
States also impose an overall cap on the profitability of 
small-group health plans. The most common means of imposing 
such a cap is the imposition of a minimum “medical loss ratio.” 
This ratio is effectively a cap on the plan’s gross margin; it 
dictates that the plan must pay out a certain percentage of its 
premiums in the form of reimbursement for medical care. As 
discussed in more detail below, although the ACA mandates 
that states impose minimum medical loss ratios, such 
regulations were common before Congress passed the ACA.81 
Beyond specifying rating methods and minimum medical 
loss ratio, states impose a grab bag of other restrictions on 
rating practices designed to make coverage more broadly 
affordable. These measures vary considerably from state to 
state. The following paragraphs draw on California’s Knox-
Keene Health Care Services Plan Act to illustrate the depth 
typical of state rating regulation. Note, however, that 
California is not perfectly representative of other states given 
the diversity of approaches from state to state. 
 
79. Community rating is not, however, a panacea for the access problems 
that plague health insurance markets. While it makes coverage more 
affordable for certain high-risk individuals, it also increases the cost of 
coverage for all individuals in the risk pool. Therefore, it has the effect of 
preventing those who cannot bear these higher costs from obtaining coverage. 
This conundrum is one of the concerns that motivated the ACA. 
80. See Small Group Health Insurance Market Rate Restrictions, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/small-group-rate-
restrictions/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Small Group Rate 
Restrictions]. 
81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.411 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 62A.021 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-25(g)(2) (West 2013); N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 3231 (McKinney 2013). Before the passage of the ACA, California 
imposed an effective cap on the profitability of health plans by capping 
administrative expenses—which include salaries—as a percentage of 
premium. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1378 (West 2008). California 
currently mandates that plans offered to small groups have a medical loss 
ratio of at least 80 percent. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.003(a)(2) 
(West 2013). 
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In addition to requiring community rating,82 California 
imposes the following restrictions on small-group rating. First, 
the price charged to a given group may be only 10 percent 
higher or lower than that charged to other small groups 
enrolled in the same plan.83 This 10 percent variation, in turn, 
may only be dictated by the age of the plan members, their 
geographic location, their family composition (i.e., whether they 
have dependents and spouses), and the employees’ benefit 
choices.84 Even within these permissible rating factors, carriers 
are limited in how they may use the factors to adjust 
premiums. Adjustments based on age must be made using 
specified age bands, and carriers may only make family-size 
adjustments based on marital status and number of children.85 
For geographic adjustments, carriers are allowed to define nine 
regions within California, which must be of a certain minimum 
size, and may only adjust premium rates based on these nine 
regions.86 Moreover, carriers may adjust the risk premium 
associated with each of these factors only once every six 
months.87 These rating restrictions apply to both new business 
and renewals. Price increases upon renewal may not exceed 10 
percent, and carriers may make such adjustments only once 
per year.88 Plans must disclose all risk-based adjustments to 
the employer.89 Lastly, any rate changed must be filed with the 
state Department of Managed Care sixty days before of taking 
effect.90 The Department has the power to review the rates for 
compliance with the law, may reject noncompliant rate 
changes, and may also take limited actions against rate 
changes it deems “unjustified.”91 
In sum, California exercises a fine degree of control over 
 
82. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.13. 
83. See id. § 1357.12. 
84. See id. § 1357(k). 
85. See id. § 1357(k)(1)-(2). 
86. See id. § 1357(k)(3). 
87. See id. §§ 1357(h), 1357.12(3). 
88. See id. § 1357.12(b). 
89. See id. § 1357.14(a). 
90. See id. § 1385.03(a)(1). 
91. See id. § 1385.11. The statute empowers the Department to post 
information about “unjustified” rate increases to its public website, and must 
report such “unreasonable” increases to the state legislature. See id. 
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pricing in the small-group market. This regulation increases 
the availability of affordable coverage to small groups, but 
comes at the cost of reduced price competition and, 
consequently, higher premiums for many groups. This degree 
of regulation is typical. California has similarly stringent (if 
not more so) standards governing the individual market.92 
Other states maintain similar regimes designed to increase 
availability by forcing carriers to spread risk.93 Importantly, 
however, states differ in terms of how carriers are expected to 
spread claims risk across small groups. Illinois, for example, 
allows carriers to define classes of small employers based on 
how the carrier markets its plans, and carriers are permitted to 
rate these classes separately.94 
 
3. Restrictions on Market Conduct 
 
In addition to regulating the pricing of health plans, states 
impose broad restrictions on how carriers may sell their plans. 
Generally speaking, these market-conduct rules specify the 
terms on which carriers must make their plans available to 
employers and the general public, the means by which carriers 
market their plans, and the circumstances in which carriers 
may terminate or refuse to renew coverage. 
California’s market-conduct regulations for small-group 
plans again provide an instructive example. Carriers must 
market their plans to all small employers in their service 
area;95 they may not, for example, focus their marketing efforts 
 
92. See id. §§ 1399.801 to 1399.818. 
93. For examples of small-group rating regulation, see CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38a-567 (West 2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 93/1–93/99 (West 
2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-25(a)(3) (West 2013); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3231 
(McKinney 2013); see also Small Group Rate Restrictions, supra note 80 
(summarizing small-group market rating restrictions by state). For examples 
of individual market rating restrictions, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-
481; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 97/25, 97/50; N.J. STAT. § 17B:27A-25(a)(3); see 
also Individual Market Rate Restrictions (Not Applicable to HIPAA Eligible 
Individuals), KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-
indicator/individual-market-rate-restrictions/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) 
(summarizing individual market rating restrictions by state). 
94. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 93/20, 93/25. 
95. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.03(a)(1). 
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on certain industries. Nor can carriers circumvent this rule by 
contracting with third parties tasked with soliciting business 
based on designated characteristics,96 or by encouraging 
undesirable clients to seek coverage elsewhere.97 Similarly, all 
plans that the carrier offers to small groups must be made 
available to all employers.98 Once a small employer applies for 
coverage, the carrier is obliged to provide it so long as the 
employer agrees to offer the benefits to all its employees, 
agrees to make payments, agrees to inform employees of 
enrollment periods, and certifies that its employees reside in 
the service area.99 Moreover, carriers must use the same 
employee contribution requirements, copays, and premiums for 
all small-group plans.100 Plans are also subject to disclosure 
requirements, both to the employer and to the state.101 
In addition to the market-conduct requirements that apply 
at the level of the sponsoring employer, carriers are subject to 
restrictions that apply at the level of the individual plan 
member. California’s regulation of the small-group market 
establishes a general rule that once a carrier offers coverage to 
an employer group, it must cover all the members of that group 
that elect to join the plan.102 In other words, carriers cannot set 
eligibility rules based on an employee’s health status, 
preexisting conditions, past claims experience, genetics, or 
disabilities.103 In addition to these health-status restrictions, 
carriers cannot permanently exclude employees from a plan 
based on their failure to join during an annual enrollment 
period, although they may exclude them for that year.104 Other 
states have similar rules.105 
 
96. See id. § 1357.03(e). 
97. See id. § 1357.03(d). 
98. See id. § 1357.03(a)(2). 
99. See id. § 1357.03(c); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176G, § 6A 
(West 2013). 
100. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.03(b). 
101. See id. § 1357.14 (outlining disclosure requirements that plans 
must make to prospective purchasers); id. § 1357.03(b) (mandating 
disclosures to the state regulator). 
102. See id. § 1357.03(f). 
103. See id. §§ 1357.03(f), 1357.05 to 1357.06. 
104. See id. § 1357.07. 
105. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1208.1 (West 2013); TEX. INS. 
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These market-conduct restrictions essentially impose an 
equal treatment requirement on carriers, such that if they are 
to enter a market at all, they must be willing to deal on equal 
terms with all those who seek coverage. Thus, while rating 
regulations assure that care is relatively affordable to those 
who have health conditions, the market-conduct restrictions 
ensure that carriers cannot avoid covering sicker individuals 
through marketing tactics or eligibility requirements. In sum, 
market-conduct rules form an important component of states’ 
efforts to ensure access to health plans.106 
 
4. Regulation of Plan Coverage 
 
The scope of health plans’ coverage is another area of 
significant state regulatory attention. States generally define a 
menu of health services that plans must cover, and they also 
impose rules governing provider access and restricting the 
means by which plans can act as gatekeepers to care. 
Turning again to California’s small-group market 
regulations, the state defines a set of “basic health services” 
that must be included in all small-group plans. The scope of 
these basic services is actually quite broad.107 An accompanying 
regulation elaborates these basic requirements, specifying to a 
fine degree of detail exactly what the plans must cover.108 
 
CODE ANN. § 1501.156 (West 2013). 
106. Here again, however, there is a tradeoff associated with these rules. 
By requiring carriers to issue policies to all who seek coverage, market-
conduct restrictions raise the cost of doing business in a market. At the 
margin, these rules may make certain markets unprofitable, and some 
carriers may decline to offer any coverage in these areas. Under these 
circumstances, consumers will have fewer choices and may pay higher 
premiums due to lack of competition. The ACA’s universal guaranteed-issue 
provision is partly an attempt to solve this problem. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b-1 
(2012). 
107. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345(b) (defining “basic health 
services,” which includes physician services, hospital inpatient services, 
ambulatory care, diagnostic services, home health services, preventative care, 
emergency health services, and hospice care); id. § 1357.08 (stipulating small-
group plan coverage requirements). 
108. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.67 (2013). Consider, for 
example, the regulatory definition of inpatient hospital services: 
 
Inpatient hospital services . . . shall mean short-term 
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Beyond prescribing what the plans must cover, states also 
specify how the plans must deliver that coverage. Two 
significant aspects of carriers’ businesses are the subject of 
regulatory attention in this vein—provider contracting and 
utilization management. 
States vary significantly in their approaches to regulating 
provider contracting. Most states employ some restrictions on 
the narrowness of a plan’s provider network—they require that 
plans contract with some or all of the providers in the state. As 
explained by Jill A. Marsteller and her colleagues: “There are 
two broad categories of statutes that restrict selective 
contracting. Any willing provider (AWP) laws require plans to 
include in their networks all providers who agree to comply 
with plan conditions. Freedom of choice (FOC) laws limit plans’ 
ability to channel patients to those selected providers.”109 
Regardless of their choice of approach, state regulation in 
this area seeks to ensure that patients have access to a 
relatively wide set of providers, and to prevent carriers from 
squeezing providers out of the market through unduly 
restrictive contracting. These goals are somewhat in tension 
with those of the carrier. Contracting with providers is one of 
the primary means by which health plans control the cost of 
 
general hospital services, including room with customary 
furnishings and equipment, meals (including special diets 
as medically necessary), general nursing care, use of 
operating room and related facilities, intensive care unit 
and services, drugs, medications, biologicals, anesthesia and 
oxygen services, diagnostic laboratory and x-ray services, 
special duty nursing as medically necessary, physical 
therapy, respiratory therapy, administration of blood and 
blood products, and other diagnostic, therapeutic and 
rehabilitative services as appropriate, and coordinated 
discharge planning including the planning of such 
continuing care as may be necessary, both medically and as 
a means of preventing possible early rehospitalization. 
 
Id. § 1300.67(b); see also FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 61, at 360 
(summarizing typical coverage mandates). 
109. Jill A. Marsteller et al., The Resurgence of Selective Contracting 
Restrictions, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1133, 1138-43, 1152-53 (1997) 
(explaining differences between approaches, and surveying regulations in 
place in each state). 
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care.110 By offering to funnel their patients to a provider 
through network rules, plans are able to negotiate discounted 
rates for care.111 While these discounts come at the cost of 
marginal patient choice, cheaper care is also in states’ 
interests, as lower costs indirectly facilitate access to care.112 
Given this delicate balance, it is unsurprising that states have 
pursued a wide range of approaches in this area.113 
In addition to requiring carriers to contract with certain 
providers, states impose restrictions on the terms of those 
contracts. The most common of these restrictions prevents 
health plans from devising incentive programs that induce 
providers to restrict the care they provide to patients.114 Some 
states, such as Illinois, have anti-retaliation provisions that 
prevent carriers from terminating provider contracts based on 
a provider’s role in advocating for a patient’s care.115 Another 
common rule restricts how often and under what circumstances 
plans can make changes to or terminate their provider 
contracts.116 
Utilization management programs and other care 
determinations are also an important subject of state 
regulatory attention. These programs are the means through 
which plans ensure that consumers do not needlessly incur 
health care expenses. The most familiar utilization 
management mechanism is prior authorization, which requires 
 
110. See id. at 1134. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. at 1154-55 (discussing why states have pursued differing 
approaches to provider contracting regulation). 
114. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6 (West 2013); cf. MD. 
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-112.2(b) (West 2013) (limiting carriers’ ability to 
condition non-HMO provider contracts on providers’ willingness to join HMO 
panels); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O, § 10 (West 2013); TEX. INS. CODE 
ANN. § 1301.068 (West 2013). 
115. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/35 (West 2013); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-112(e), (g); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O, § 4; TEX. 
INS. CODE ANN. § 1301.066. 
116. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/368b; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 1375.7; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-478h, 38a-479b (West 2013) 
(regulating the termination of provider contracts, changes to fee schedules, 
use of most-favored nation provisions, and payment disputes between 
carriers and providers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-17.18-1 (West 2013); TEX. 
INS. CODE ANN. § 1301.057. 
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plan members to obtain referrals or other permission before 
seeking specialist care.117 Typical state regulation of utilization 
management programs requires that carriers adhere to written 
evaluation criteria that are developed with physician input.118 
States also require that carriers have an internal appeal 
process in place for members to contest care determinations,119 
and some require that members have recourse to independent 
reviews.120 Lastly, some states also impose regulations that 
restrict the grounds upon which carriers may deny coverage. 
California, for example, does not allow carriers to deny 
payment for coverage received on an emergency basis after 
hours unless the plan maintains a hotline that a member can 
use to obtain a coverage decision within thirty minutes.121 
 
5. Producer Regulation 
 
Insurance producers—that is, brokers and agents who sell 
plans to individuals and employers—are another object of state 
regulatory attention. States require that agents and brokers 
obtain a license before engaging in insurance transactions.122 
In California, obtaining a license requires, among other things, 
that the agent pass an examination,123 participate in 
continuing education programs,124 and pay a fee.125 Once 
 
117. See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 61, at 627-28. 
118. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1363.5, 1367.01; CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-591c(2); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1756O, § 12(a); TEX. 
INS. CODE ANN. § 4201.151. 
119. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.2; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38a-591e; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10a-
02; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O, §§ 12(e), 13; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. 
§§ 4201.351 to 4201.360. 
120. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38a-591g; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A-
03; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O § 14; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 4201.401 to 
4201.403. 
121. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.36. 
122. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1626 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38a-702b; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/500-15; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 10-103; 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60K.37 (West 2013); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 4001.101. 
123. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1676. 
124. See id. § 1749.31. 
125. See id. § 1750. 
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licensed, agents are subject to restrictions regarding 
commission sharing,126 and are subject to stringent fiduciary 
standards.127 These regulations reflect the importance states 
have attached to the insurance distribution process as a means 
of consumer protection. 
 
D. The Benefits of State Health Insurance Regulation 
 
States are well suited to performing the regulatory 
functions described above. In general, allowing regulatory 
functions to remain at the state level promotes democratic 
accountability, creativity, and sensitivity to local interests. 
Beyond these general benefits that pertain to many industries, 
there is reason to think that health insurance in particular is 
an apt candidate for state regulation. 
First, the regulation of health plans is inextricably 
intertwined with the cost, quality, and availability of health 
care. These connections are relatively easy to see: the rate that 
consumers must pay to have health insurance affects their 
ability to receive care. Similarly, the way insurance carriers 
compensate providers (and especially how they structure their 
contracts) affects providers’ incentives to provide cost-effective, 
quality care. While these connections are not difficult to see, 
the relationship between them is complex, and fraught with 
tradeoffs. By relaxing provider network standards, for example, 
states may make health insurance more affordable at the 
margin (by allowing carriers to consolidate their networks and 
negotiate more aggressively with providers), but these cost 
savings may aggravate consumers, who may no longer be able 
to see the doctor of their choice. To the extent that these 
dilemmas have answers, they are difficult to discern in the 
abstract. Accordingly, the health care system as a whole 
benefits from states’ willingness to experiment with different 
regulatory rules. Those that work can serve as a model for 
other states, and those that do not can be scrapped in favor of a 
 
126. See, e.g., id. § 1724 (prohibiting agents from sharing commissions 
with members of the bar). 
127. See, e.g., id. §§ 1734, 1734.5. 
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superior scheme from a neighboring jurisdiction.128 
Many of these tradeoffs, however, are not amenable to a 
single solution. Rather, the choices states must make between 
access, quality, and cost are simply value judgments. One 
electorate may wish to have richer minimum health benefits, 
either at the expense of greater cost or provider choice. Another 
may prefer a more modest minimum set of benefits, with the 
aim of allowing lower cost, high-deductible plans to be 
available for those who might otherwise forego coverage. 
Allowing states to make differing regulatory judgments 
regarding these kinds of questions affords consumers a greater 
opportunity to influence regulators’ approaches to these 
tradeoffs.129 It is also much easier for consumers to organize 
and influence a state insurance regulator than a national 
one.130 This is especially true given the movement toward 
 
128. This kind of regulatory cross-pollination is particularly likely to 
take place in the insurance-regulation context, as the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, a voluntary association of state insurance 
regulators, provides a mechanism for states to share ideas. See Randall, 
supra note 15, at 636-37. 
129. See Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter 
for Insurance: Rationale and Design, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 55, 72-73 (arguing that 
a national insurance regulator would be less responsive to consumers than a 
local one). 
130. The fact that many health plans are purchased by employers may 
amplify consumers’ voices in this context. The employer provides a natural 
organizing point for consumers, who can readily coordinate lobbying efforts 
with similarly situated individuals. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics 
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285-87 (1988) (summarizing public choice 
literature on interest groups, which suggests that ease of organization is an 
important predictor of the success of an interest group). Relocation is 
another—albeit more extreme—means of influencing regulation at the state, 
but not the national, level. To the extent that the content of insurance 
regulation is important to consumers or employers who sponsor health plans, 
they are free to relocate to a state with rules they prefer. Of course, a state’s 
health insurance regulatory policies are unlikely to dictate where an 
individual will choose to live or an employer will choose to locate. But these 
policies are likely to be correlated with other issues (such as overall levels of 
taxation and business climate) that may affect such choices. Accordingly, 
there is reason to think individuals and firms derive some benefit from state 
diversity in this regard. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20 (1956). 
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elected state insurance commissioners.131 
A second reason to think state regulation of health 
insurance is desirable relates specifically to rate regulation. 
State regulators, particularly in those states with elected 
insurance commissioners, have a desire to keep insurance rates 
as low as possible for consumers. The danger of this kind of 
rate regulation is that states may go too far, setting rates at a 
level that makes it impossible for carriers to operate profitably. 
If this happens in a system with a single regulator, carriers 
have few options. However, if a single state applies this kind of 
pressure to a carrier, the firm may exit that state’s market.132 
Since consumers have an interest in preventing such exits 
because they reduce the amount of choice in the market, the 
ability of carriers to exit a state provides a check against what 
might otherwise be an overwhelming popular demand for low 
rates. 
A third reason to favor state regulation of health insurance 
is that many important aspects of health insurance markets 
are local. Much of the profitability of health insurers turns on 
the reimbursement agreements they make with providers. This 
contracting dynamic in turn depends on the relative 
concentration of providers in a market. For example, if one 
hospital dominates a small town, a health carrier will have 
little choice but to reach a reimbursement agreement with the 
hospital—consumers in that town would not want to have a 
health plan that didn’t cover care in the only hospital. In this 
situation, the hospital would have a great deal of negotiating 
leverage over the carrier. State governments are better 
positioned to take stock of these dynamics when setting 
 
131. See Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 82-83 & n.282 (arguing that 
structural reforms such as the movement toward election of insurance 
commissioners and mandated consumer participation in rate setting may 
give consumers too much sway over state regulators). One scholar has argued 
that consumers “do not participate in insurance issues,” and therefore the 
industry’s influence over regulators is greater than that of consumers. See 
Randall, supra note 15, at 669-72. There is reason to think, however, that 
regulator-industry dynamic is different in the health insurance context. 
Health insurance issues are much more salient, and the fact that health 
benefits are employer provided makes it easier for consumers to organize. 
132. See Randall, supra note 15, at 675-76; Richard A. Epstein, Exit 
Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 293, 300-04 (1999). 
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insurance regulation rules. Rules related to provider networks 
and provider-carrier contracting, in particular, may need to be 
adjusted to reflect the relative positions of providers and 
carriers in a given market. 
The final reason to favor state health insurance regulation 
is that states have developed considerable institutional 
capabilities in the general area of insurance regulation. This 
experience suggests both that states may be more effective 
regulators (because of the benefits of this experience), and that 
they may be able to regulate in certain areas more efficiently 
than a federal regulator due to economies of scale (for example 
the regulation of insurance agents, who work in both the 
property-casualty and health markets). 
 
*** 
 
In sum, states devote a significant amount of regulatory 
energy to managing the conduct of health plans. The broad 
outlines of these regulations are fairly consistent from state-to-
state, which is unsurprising given states share a common goal 
of providing access to health coverage at reasonable cost. 
However, there is considerable diversity in the specific means 
states have chosen to meet those shared ends. These 
differences are consequential—they have a direct impact on the 
relative cost of plans. And at bottom, they reflect political 
economy judgments—some states are more willing than others 
to accept higher cost of care in exchange for broader 
coverage.133 Moreover, state-based regulation of health 
insurance likely allows greater opportunity for consumers to 
influence their regulators, leads to more efficient rate 
regulation (by preserving exit options for carriers), encourages 
sensitivity to local interests, and allows states to capture 
synergies by consolidating regulation of health and other lines 
of insurance under a single authority. 
By assigning primary regulatory responsibility to the 
 
133. See Robert Detlefsen, Dual Insurance Chartering: Potential 
Consequences, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 18, at 97, 103-08 (characterizing property-casualty 
insurance as a means of redistributing wealth to achieve social welfare goals, 
and noting the concomitant political salience of insurance regulation). 
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states, the current regulatory structure for health insurance 
suggests a judgment that it is worth preserving states’ role in 
health insurance regulation. Even before passage of the ACA, 
however, states were not the exclusive regulators of health 
plans. As the next section explains, certain judgments about 
plan regulation have long been made at the federal level. 
 
IV. Federal Regulation of Health Plans Before the ACA 
 
Congress did not work from a blank slate when it enacted 
the ACA. The federal government has played a role in the 
regulation of health plans since the 1970s, beginning with the 
enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 
(“HMO Act”).134 Therefore, to understand the ways in which the 
ACA affects the state-federal balance of regulatory authority, 
one must understand the pre-ACA federal regulatory regime. 
This Part briefly explains the contours of three federal statutes 
that bear on the regulations of health plans: the HMO Act, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)135 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”).136 
 
A. The HMO Act 
 
The HMO Act was the first significant federal statute to 
directly regulate health insurance. Congress hoped the Act 
would encourage the development of HMOs, which were seen 
as an effective way to manage the cost of health care.137 As 
originally conceived, the HMO Act was something of a quid-
pro-quo offer to HMOs: HMOs could elect to become federally 
registered, which entitled them to various forms of federal 
 
134. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 
300e-14a (2012). 
135. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
136. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
137. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 
1267 (2d ed. 1998). 
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support (including access to a subsidized loan program), in 
exchange for compliance with a set of federal regulations.138 
Some of the rules in the HMO Act touched on traditional 
areas of state regulation. The Act established a minimum set of 
benefits that HMO plans are required to offer,139 set rules 
regarding access to care, including both provider contracting 
and utilization management,140 and also regulated HMO 
solvency.141 However, these rules were far from comprehensive, 
and appear to be geared primarily toward ensuring the 
integrity of the HMO Act’s loan program. Consistent with this 
observation, the HMO Act did not include a preemption 
provision, and expressly contemplated that state regulations 
would continue to apply to HMOs, at least insofar as they did 
not prevent them from doing business in the state.142 Thus, 
while the HMO Act is significant in that it represents the 
federal government’s first steps into substantive health 
insurance regulation, it did little to alter the balance of federal 
and state regulatory authority. The same is not true of ERISA, 
the next major federal statute affecting health plans. 
 
B. ERISA 
 
Prior to the passage of the ACA, ERISA was the most 
important federal statute in terms of defining the boundaries of 
state and federal regulatory authority over health plans. Given 
this import, it is odd that Congress did not intend ERISA to be 
a health care measure at all. Rather, ERISA was intended to 
prevent fraud and mismanagement in the administration of 
employee benefit schemes, particularly those intended to 
provide retirement income.143 The statute’s definition of 
 
138. See id. at 1267-68. 
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.101 (1993). 
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(3)-(4); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.103. 
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.120. 
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (exempting HMOs that “cannot do business 
. . . in a State” from state regulations that “prevent it from operating as a 
health maintenance organization”). 
143. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 137, at 66; Jana K. Strain & 
Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and 
Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 29, 30 (1999). 
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“employee benefit plan,” however, was broad enough to 
encompass certain types of employer-provided health coverage, 
namely plans established by employers that affect interstate 
commerce.144 
The significance of the fact that some health plans fall 
under ERISA relates to the Act’s sweeping preemption 
provision. As currently enacted, the provision provides that 
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”145 
In other words, plans subject to ERISA are not subject to state 
insurance regulation. This general provision is, however, 
subject to an important qualification: “nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person 
from any law of any State which regulates insurance.”146 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the insurance 
regulation exemption to confine ERISA’s reach to self-insured 
employer health plans—that is, those where the employer, and 
not an insurance carrier, bears the financial risk of employees’ 
claims.147 Under this reading of the provision, third-party 
administrators (often health insurance carriers) that assist 
employers with the administration of self-funded plans are also 
subject to ERISA. Thus, ERISA effectively exempts both 
 
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012). This definition is subject to several 
exceptions, including a limited one for health insurers. See id. § 1003(b). 
145. Id. § 1144(a). 
146. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). This provision preserving state insurance 
regulation is in turn subject to a so-called “deemer” provision designed to 
ensure that the insurance regulation exemption does not swallow the general 
rule: “an employee benefit plan . . . shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance 
company . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate 
insurance companies.” Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
147. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985) 
(“Plans may self-insure or they may purchase insurance for their 
participants. Plans that purchase insurance—so-called ‘insured plans’—are 
directly affected by state laws that regulate the insurance industry.”). Many 
employers who run self-funded plans purchase a form of reinsurance known 
as stop-loss coverage designed to protect the employer should plan expenses 
rise to catastrophic levels. See Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: 
ERISA Preemption Under the Deemer Clause as Applied to Employer Health 
Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J. LEGIS. 307, 311-13 (1997) 
(collecting cases). Courts have split over whether the stop-loss products, 
which closely resemble traditional forms of risk insurance, fall within the 
scope of ERISA’s preemption provision. See id. 
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employers who provide self-funded plans, along with any 
insurance company that the employer may hire to administer 
the self-funded plan, from the ambit of state regulation.148 
ERISA thus effectively carves the health insurance market 
into two distinct spheres with different regulators: federally 
regulated employer-funded health plans (primarily offered by 
large employers), and state-regulated “risk” plans (offered to 
smaller employers and individuals). As the language of 
ERISA’s preemption provision suggests, state regulators are 
virtually ousted from the self-funded market. 
ERISA’s effect on the overall allocation of state and federal 
regulatory authority is significant. As of 2012, approximately 
89.4 million Americans were enrolled in an employer-funded 
health plan.149 This figure represents roughly one-third of the 
nonelderly (i.e., non-Medicare-eligible) population in the United 
States.150 While this still leaves the lion’s share of the insurable 
population—roughly 60 million people with risk-based group 
plans, 15 million people with individual plans, and 48 million 
uninsured individuals151—subject to state regulation, ERISA 
 
148. In holding that an insurance carrier, Provident, was not subject to 
state regulation in its capacity as a third-party administrator of a self-funded 
health plan, the Ninth Circuit explained: 
 
The primary features of an insurance contract are the 
spreading and underwriting of a policyholder’s risk . . . . 
There was no insurance contract or policy involved in [the 
employee’s] claim. Provident’s role in relation to the [Plan] 
and [the employee’s] claim was not that of an insurance 
company but was merely as an administrative overseer. 
Provident’s privilege to review the administrator’s 
determination of the amount of a claim and to defend or 
settle any action on a claim under the Plan does not require 
a finding that Provident was engaged in the business of 
insurance in relation to the Plan. 
 
Moore v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(citation omitted). 
149. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. ET AL., supra note 75, at 50, 161 
(reporting that 149 million Americans had employer-sponsored health 
coverage, and that 60 percent of these individuals were enrolled in employer-
funded plans). 
150. See id. at 14. 
151. See id. at 50; John Holahan & Megan McGrath, Reversing the 
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nonetheless creates a significant role for the federal 
government. 
A curious aspect of ERISA’s relation to health plans is that 
although it displaces state regulation, it imposes very little 
federal regulation of health plans. The statute contains a 
number of regulatory provisions, but they do not impose the 
kind of substantive restrictions on the health insurance 
business that are commonplace in state regulations.152 The 
statute’s regulations reflect its orientation toward non-health 
insurance forms of employee benefits, such as pension plans. 
For example, the statute imposes restrictions on what 
employers may do with benefit plan funds,153 and imposes 
fiduciary requirements on plan administrators.154 Perhaps of 
more utility to health plan members, the statute provides a 
private cause of action that members can invoke to enforce the 
processing of claims.155 While these provisions may have 
indirect effects on the management of health plans, one could 
not characterize them as substitutes for traditional state 
regulations, such as those that restrict plan rating or 
marketing. 
ERISA does contain a handful of regulations specifically 
targeted at health insurance, but they are modest in scope, and 
were all added to the original statute by subsequent legislation. 
For example, provisions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”)156 require employers to 
allow employees to retain health coverage, at their own 
expense, following termination of their employment or other 
triggering events.157 Other pieces of federal legislation have 
imposed mandates that employer-funded plans cover certain 
 
Trend? Understanding the Recent Increase in Health Insurance Coverage 
Among the Nonelderly Population, KAISER COMM’N MEDICAID & UNINSURED 14 
(Mar. 2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/8264-
02.pdf. 
152. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 to 1112 (2012). 
153. See id. § 1106. 
154. See id. § 1104. 
155. See id. § 1132(a). 
156. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986). 
157. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161 to 1168 (requiring employer-funded health 
plans to offer coverage, at cost, to employees who satisfy certain criteria). 
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types of care. These coverage requirements, however, are 
extremely limited—they apply only to certain maternity and 
newborn-care services, mental-health coverage, and 
mastectomies.158 Significantly, there is no provision requiring 
that a plan cover a basic package of essential benefits. Lastly, 
as will be discussed further in the next section, HIPAA imposes 
several modest reforms related to portability and coverage of 
preexisting conditions. 
Taken together, ERISA’s provisions result in what some 
commentators have termed a “regulatory vacuum.”159 The 
statute displaces state regulation of employer-funded health 
plans, but does not impose comparable regulations of its own, 
leaving the self-funded employer market virtually free of the 
kind of regulation states typically impose in health insurance 
markets. The major post-ERISA federal forays into health 
insurance regulation—HIPAA and the ACA—have not altered 
this pattern, as they are primarily focused on the individual 
and small-employer markets. 
 
C. HIPAA 
 
The 1996 HIPAA statute, primarily known for the privacy 
standards it imposes on health providers, also contained 
several modest insurance market reforms.160 These reforms, 
which apply to both the group “risk” markets and the 
individual market, were in some ways precursors to the rules 
in the ACA—indeed the ACA superseded many of them. The 
HIPAA rules cover some of the same subjects as the ACA, such 
as guaranteed issue requirements and preexisting condition 
exclusions, but their requirements are considerably less 
stringent. 
 
158. See id. § 1185 (maternity and newborn care requirements); id. 
§ 1185a (mental health benefits); id. § 1185b (benefits for reconstructive 
surgery following mastectomies); see also Strain & Kinney, supra note 143, at 
43 (recounting the legislative history behind these provisions). 
159. See Strain & Kinney, supra note 143, at 50. For a summary of 
criticisms that have been levied against ERISA on this score, see id. at 40; see 
also Morrissey, supra note 147, at 307. 
160. See generally HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
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In the group market, HIPAA limits, but does not eliminate, 
carriers’ ability to impose preexisting condition 
requirements.161 Specifically, the Act imposes a number of 
timing rules that limit the circumstances in which carriers may 
decline to cover a preexisting condition. For example, the 
prospective member must have received care for the condition 
within six months before applying for coverage.162 HIPAA also 
caps the length of time that the preexisting condition exclusion 
may apply.163 And it prevents carriers from using patients’ 
genetic information as a means of defining exclusions.164 In a 
similar vein, the statute prevents carriers from using health 
status as an eligibility rule for coverage, or from charging 
higher premiums based on health risk.165 These reforms are 
part of a broader set of rules intended to facilitate patient 
movement between health plans.166 
HIPAA contains a similar set of provisions affecting the 
individual market. Carriers were prohibited from declining to 
extend coverage in the individual market to prospective 
members who previously had qualifying coverage.167 HIPAA 
also obliged individual market plans to renew coverage for all 
members that requested renewal, absent certain specified 
circumstances such as nonpayment of premiums, fraud, or 
termination of the plan.168 
These HIPAA market regulations bear a family 
resemblance to those contained in the ACA. But they are much 
more modest in scope. For example, the guaranteed issue 
provisions in both the group and individual markets are subject 
 
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012). 
162. See id. 1181(a)(1). 
163. See id. § 1181. 
164. See id. § 1181(b). 
165. See id. § 1182. 
166. See, e.g., id. § 1181 (requiring that plans allow certain individuals 
who lost other coverage to enroll at any time regardless of enrollment 
schedule, and imposing similar rules for dependent coverage). 
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41 (2012). This individual market 
guaranteed-issue provision was subject to an exception available to carriers 
able to show that accepting additional individual market members would 
impose an unacceptable stain on their financial reserves. See id. § 300gg-
41(e) (referring to the first subsection (e), “Application of financial capacity 
limits”). 
168. See id. § 300gg-42. 
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to a number of exceptions, and neither applies uniformly to all 
prospective members. Perhaps more importantly, HIPAA’s 
individual market rules were, in a sense, optional. Section 2744 
of the Act contained a state waiver provision that exempted 
plans in states that had implemented an “acceptable 
alternative mechanism” from HIPAA’s individual guaranteed 
issue requirement.169 Among such permissible mechanisms 
were public solutions, including state-run high-risk pools.170 
Thus, states wishing to avoid the imposition of HIPAA rules on 
their private individual market carriers could satisfy the 
statute’s requirements by other means. The group market 
reforms did not contain a waiver provision, but nonetheless 
preserved ample room for continued operation of state laws 
that did not prevent the application of the HIPAA rules.171 
Therefore, the group market reforms did little to affect the 
federal-state regulatory balance beyond establishing a limited 
guaranteed issue requirement. 
In sum, while Congress enacted several pieces of 
legislation that regulated private health insurance markets 
before the ACA, these statutes—with the exception of ERISA’s 
(unintended) effects in the self-funded market—largely 
preserved the states’ role as the primary regulator of 
insurance. The ACA, however, fundamentally altered that 
balance. 
 
V. The ACA’s Health Insurance Market Reforms 
 
A significant portion of the ACA’s 906 pages is devoted to 
health insurance market reforms. To understand how these 
reforms alter the balance of federal and state regulatory 
authority, it is necessary to understand both the substantive 
content of the Act’s rules and the institutions charged with 
enforcing them. To that end, this Part first explains the role of 
 
169. See id. § 300gg-44(a). 
170. See id. § 300gg-44(b). 
171. See 29 U.S.C. § 1191(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]his part shall not be 
construed to supersede any provision of State law which establishes . . . any 
standard or requirement solely relating to health insurance issuers . . . except 
to the extent that such standard or requirement prevents the application of a 
requirement of this part.”). 
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health insurance exchanges in the ACA’s regulatory 
architecture. It then discusses the reforms that apply to all 
health plans, regardless of how they are sold, before turning to 
the regulations that specifically affect plans sold through the 
exchanges. It concludes with a brief discussion of the Act’s 
provisions regarding multistate plans. 
 
A. The Role of Health Exchanges in the ACA’s Regulatory 
Regime 
 
One of the signature provisions of the ACA is its creation 
of state-run health plan marketplaces, formally termed 
“American Health Benefit Exchanges.”172 The exchanges are 
intended to be the primary means by which individuals and 
small groups purchase coverage under the ACA. The theory 
behind the exchanges is straightforward. They seek to simplify 
health plan purchasing decisions by marrying a streamlined 
presentation of plan choices with a centralized listing of 
qualified plans available in the state.173 In addition to these 
consumer-facing attributes, Congress hoped that the exchanges 
would improve the functioning of the individual and small-
group markets by increasing transparency and facilitating 
consumer choice.174 The exchanges play a significant role in the 
regulation of insurance markets because, as discussed in 
greater detail below, the ACA empowers exchanges to impose 
or enforce a number of rules regulating the conduct of plans 
participating in the exchange. 
Rather than establishing a single federal exchange, the 
drafters of the ACA opted to require the states to establish 
 
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2012). The Act includes separate 
provisions for small employers, which are to purchase coverage through the 
“Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP).” These provisions track 
those for the individual-market exchanges in relevant respects. See id. 
173. See Health Plan Information for Individuals and Families, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV., https://www.healthcare.gov/health-plan-information/ (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
174. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-
Reports/2010/Jul/Health-Insurance-Exchanges-and-the-Affordable-Care-
Act.aspx. 
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exchanges.175 States’ exchange plans are subject to review by 
the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).176 As 
of March 7, 2013, HHS has approved twenty-five states’ 
exchange plans.177 Securing approval of an exchange required 
submission of an exchange “blueprint” to HHS by January 1, 
2013.178 HHS evaluated these submissions to determine 
whether the exchange would be able to carry out its required 
functions and to assess whether it would be able to do so by the 
applicable deadlines.179 Importantly, if a state elected not to 
create its own exchange, or if it failed to submit its blueprint by 
the January 2013 deadline, the regulations stipulate that 
“HHS must (directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit 
entity) establish and operate such Exchange within the 
State.”180 
Although the ACA envisions that the exchanges will be the 
primary means by which consumers and small businesses 
purchase health coverage, the Act does permit the continued 
operation of other distribution channels.181 This provision 
 
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.10, 155.110 (2012). 
The exchanges must be organized as a state agency or as a not-for-profit 
corporation. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.110(c). If the exchange is to be run by a 
nonprofit corporation, that organization must have “demonstrated experience 
on a State or regional basis in the individual and small-group health 
insurance markets and in benefits coverage,” and cannot be a health 
insurance issuer. Id. § 155.110(a). An insurance agent, for example, would 
have “demonstrated experience” in health insurance markets, but is not a 
health insurer. 
176. See id. § 155.105. 
177. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Oversight, State Health Insurance 
Marketplaces, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/state-marketplaces.html (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2014). HHS has approved single-state exchanges in the 
following states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and 
Washington. See id. HHS has approved partnership exchanges in an 
additional seven states: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, and West Virginia. See id. These regional exchanges are 
authorized under a separate set of rules, but otherwise function similarly to a 
single-state exchange. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.140. 
178. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.105(a). 
179. See id. § 155.105(b). 
180. See id. § 155.105(f). 
181. See 42 U.S.C. §18032 (2012). 
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allows insurance agents and brokers to continue to find 
coverage for individuals and businesses and leaves the 
regulation of these individuals to state authorities.182 
Moreover, these intermediaries are permitted to enroll 
individuals and businesses in plans offered on exchanges.183 
They also are able to continue to market plans that are not 
deemed qualified to be offered on the exchange.184 Thus, the 
ACA envisions two markets for health plans operating in 
parallel: the market for “qualified” plans, which may be sold 
through the exchange and other distribution channels, and the 
market for other plans, which may only be sold outside the 
exchange. However, even these “nonqualified” plans are subject 
to extensive regulation under the ACA. 
 
B. The ACA’s Universal Insurance Market Regulations 
 
As part of its general reform of health insurance markets, 
the ACA imposes a number of regulations that apply to all 
health plans, regardless of whether they are sold through the 
ACA exchanges. These provisions effectively federalize a 
portion of health plan regulation. Although the provisions do 
leave room for states to impose additional rules, particularly if 
the state rules are more stringent than those in the Act, they 
nonetheless significantly restrict states’ freedom to regulate 
rating, underwriting, and market conduct. 
The most significant of the ACA’s universal regulations 
pertain to rating and underwriting. First, the Act sharply 
restricts how carriers may rate their plans. Specifically, the Act 
allows only four rating factors: family composition, age, 
geography, and tobacco use.185 Even within these factors, the 
 
182. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. § 18032(d)(3)(B). 
185. See id. § 300gg(a)(1)(B). The ACA also regulates how carriers may 
use these factors. For example, it stipulates that the variation in pricing for 
individuals of different ages may not exceed a ratio of three to one, and that 
HHS has authority to define the age bands carriers may use. See id. §§ 
300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii), 300gg(a)(3). Similarly, the Act mandates that rates may 
not vary by more than 1.5 to 1 for tobacco use. Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv). With 
respect to rating by geography, the Act requires states to define geographic 
regions for rating purposes, and grants the HHS Secretary the right to review 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
  
2014] UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACA 315 
Act limits what carriers may do. Beyond limiting carriers to 
certain rating factors, the ACA also specifies that they must 
group all individual and small-group applicants in the same 
risk pool—that is, there must be a single set of rating factor 
adjustments for the entirety of the individual and small-group 
markets.186 Lastly, the Act limits the extent to which employers 
may share costs with their employees.187 Specifically, the Act 
caps deductibles and other employee contributions at specified 
dollar amounts.188 
The ACA also confers temporary authority on the HHS 
Secretary to review and approve any rate changes before they 
take effect.189 Should the Secretary determine that a given rate 
increase is “unreasonable,” the Secretary “shall require health 
insurance issuers to submit to the Secretary and the relevant 
State a justification for an unreasonable premium increase 
prior to the implementation of the increase.”190 Moreover, the 
Act requires carriers to post rate-change information to their 
public websites.191 HHS will initially conduct this annual 
review process, but it will later be transferred to the states for 
ongoing administration.192 Even after this transition, however, 
HHS retains continuing responsibility to monitor rate 
changes.193 
One of the most high-profile market reforms in the ACA is 
 
those areas and impose a substitute set of areas if the state’s efforts are 
deemed inadequate. See id. § 300gg(a)(2). 
186. See id. § 18032(c). 
187. See id. § 300gg-6(b). 
188. See id. § 18022(c). These cost sharing limits do not apply to plans 
offered in the individual market. See id. 
189. See id. § 300gg-94(a). 
190. Id. § 300gg-94(a)(2). 
191. See id. § 300gg-94(a)(2). This provision is one of a number of 
reporting requirements that apply to all health plans. See also id. § 300gg-
15a (requiring that carriers operating outside the exchange provide the 
public with the information listed in 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(3)); id. § 300gg-15 
(requiring carriers to provide benefit summaries, in a form specified by the 
HHS Secretary, to all members); id. § 300gg-17(a)(2) (requiring carriers to 
submit care quality reports to HHS); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically 
Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1368-69, 1379-80 (2011) 
(championing the ACA’s various disclosure requirements as examples of best 
practices). 
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94. 
193. See id. § 300gg-94(b)(2). 
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its “guaranteed issue” requirement, which obligates “each 
health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage 
in the individual or group market in a State [to] accept every 
employer and individual in the State that applies for such 
coverage.”194 The guaranteed issue requirement fits closely 
with four other provisions: a guaranteed renewability 
requirement,195 a bar on preexisting condition exclusions,196 a 
bar on the use of lifetime benefit caps,197 and a (duplicative) bar 
on health-based eligibility rules.198 Taken together, these rules 
force carriers to accept groups and individuals that would 
otherwise have difficulty finding coverage due the poor health 
status of their members.199 
The ACA also sets a floor of minimum coverage that every 
health plan must provide. Specifically, it demands that plans 
sold in the individual or small-group markets offer an 
“essential health benefits package.”200 The Act defines the 
essential health benefits package to include coverage for 
services within ten general categories,201 but does not mandate 
the specific services that must be offered. Rather, the Act 
requires that the HHS Secretary promulgate specific 
requirements by rule, with reference “to the scope of benefits 
provided [by] a typical employer plan.”202 In addition to the 
essential health benefits requirements, the Act includes a 
number of other coverage rules related to specific types of 
 
194. Id. § 300gg-1(a). 
195. See id. § 300gg-2(a) (“[I]f a health insurance issuer offers health 
insurance coverage in the individual or group market, the issuer must renew 
or continue in force such coverage at the option of the plan sponsor or the 
individual, as applicable.”). 
196. See id. § 300gg-3. 
197. See id. § 300gg-11. 
198. See id. § 300gg-4. 
199. Another widely reported coverage requirement imposed by the Act 
is a rule that employer-sponsored plans must extend coverage to employees’ 
dependents until they reach twenty-six years of age. See id. § 300gg-14. 
200. See id. §§ 300gg-6, 18022. 
201. The ten categories are: ambulatory patient services, emergency 
services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and 
substance abuse services, prescription drugs, rehabilitation services, 
laboratory diagnostics, preventative care and disease management, and 
pediatric services. See id. § 18022(b)(1). 
202. Id. § 18022(b)(2)(A).  
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care.203 To ensure that carriers do not circumvent these 
coverage requirements with unduly restrictive approval 
requirements, the Act mandates that carriers provide recourse 
to both internal and external appeals processes.204 
Collectively, these rules will impose a significant cost 
burden on carriers, as they will be required to accept members 
regardless of health status, must offer them a minimum set of 
benefits, and are sharply restricted in their ability to charge 
premiums commensurate to these risks. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the Act also includes a number of provisions 
intended to address the financial strain that these rules impose 
on carriers.205 
The Act sets up two transitional programs that apply from 
2014 until 2016. First, the Act mandates that all self-funded 
employer plans—that is, those plans offered by large 
employers—pay a levy that is used to fund a reinsurance plan 
for the individual and small-group markets.206 The idea behind 
this reinsurance plan is that it will help stabilize premiums in 
the individual and small-group markets by providing support 
for carriers that experience catastrophic losses as a result of 
taking on high-risk members. Thus, the reinsurance provision 
is essentially a tax on employees of large companies that is 
used to fund the ACA’s care expansion. The second transitional 
program establishes so-called “risk corridors,” which 
redistribute profits and losses between carriers in the 
individual and small-group markets.207 Any carrier that runs a 
 
203. See, e.g., id. § 300gg-19a(b) (barring the use of prior authorization 
requirements for emergency stabilization services, and mandating that 
carriers not impose higher costs on consumers for using out-of-network 
emergency services; id. § 300gg-19a(d) (prohibiting the use of prior 
authorization for certain gynecological services); id. § 300gg-13 (imposing 
specific preventative services coverage requirements). 
204. See id. § 300gg-19 (requiring that carriers establish an internal 
review process, and either comply with a state external review process or 
develop one of their own if no state-run process exists). 
205. It warrants mention that the Act also contains a temporary rule, in 
effect until the end of 2013, which is intended to deal with the opposite 
problem—that is, to penalize carriers whose plans are too profitable. See also 
id. § 300gg-18 (requiring carriers to issue consumer rebates for plans that 
have loss ratios below a certain threshold). 
206. See id. § 18061. 
207. See id. § 18062. 
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plan with a loss ratio below 97 percent must pay a percentage 
of its profits into the risk-corridor program.208 These profits will 
be used to compensate those carriers who suffer loss ratios 
above 103 percent.209 
Beyond these temporary measures, the ACA requires 
states to institute risk-adjustment programs, where states 
transfer funds between plans based on their actuarial risks.210 
States must measure the state average actuarial risk for a 
given type of plan, and levy a fee against those plans with 
below-average risks, and compensate those with above-average 
risks.211 
To summarize, the ACA sets a number of bounds on all 
health plans’ ability to define plan benefits and set premiums. 
In aggregate, these provisions have the effect of forcing health 
plans to take on the risk associated with insuring all who seek 
coverage. While these regulations substantially duplicate or 
replace a significant portion of states’ traditional regulatory 
prerogatives, they leave a number of areas of state regulation 
undisturbed. The ACA’s universal regulations, for instance, do 
not place limits on plan’s marketing techniques, provider 
contracting, or care management practices. Plans sold through 
the ACA’s exchanges, however, are subject to more extensive 
regulation, which the drafters envisioned would be 
administered by the exchanges themselves. 
 
C. Regulation of Health Plans Sold Through ACA Exchanges 
 
Beyond providing a convenient means for consumers to 
 
208. Id. § 18062(b)(2). Plans must pay 1.5 percent of their gross 
premium, less administrative expenses (the “target amount”), into the risk 
corridor program if their loss ratios are between 92 and 97 percent. If their 
loss ratios are below 92 percent, the plan must pay 2.5 percent of its target 
amount into the program, as well as 80 percent of profits above a defined 
amount. See id. 
209. See id. § 18062(b)(1). If a plan’s loss ratio is between 103 and 
108 percent, the plan will receive a 50 percent reimbursement for losses 
above 103 percent. That is, if a plan experiences a loss ratio of 105, the 
program will pay the plan 1 percent of the target amount. Higher payouts are 
available for plans with loss ratios exceeding 108 percent. See id. 
210. See id. § 18063. 
211. See id. § 18063(a). 
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shop for health plans, the ACA exchanges also play a 
significant role in the regulation of health plans. The ACA 
delegates a substantial amount of regulatory authority to the 
exchanges, principally by giving exchanges the power to 
determine which plans may be sold on the exchange. As part of 
this power, exchanges have the responsibility to scrutinize each 
plan’s benefits, premium, and network—all of which have 
traditionally been regulated by the states. This section will 
describe the role the exchanges play in the ACA’s regulatory 
scheme. Part VI will explore the consequences this role has on 
states’ regulatory authority. 
 
1. Certification and Rate Review 
 
Many of the exchanges’ regulatory functions relate to the 
ACA’s requirement that only “qualified health plans” (“QHPs”) 
may be sold on the exchanges.212 To be certified as a QHP, a 
plan must: meet the minimum statutory certification criteria; 
provide the ACA’s essential health benefits package; and be 
offered by a state-licensed health insurer that agrees to 
additional requirements.213 The exchanges are responsible for 
certifying that plans meet these requirements.214 In addition to 
verifying that the plans adhere to the statutory criteria, the 
ACA grants the exchanges broad discretion to approve or deny 
a certification application: “An Exchange may certify a health 
plan as a qualified health plan if [the plan meets the statutory 
requirements] and . . . the Exchange determines that making 
available such health plan through such Exchange is in the 
interests of qualified individuals and qualified employers in the 
State.”215 
The ACA’s statutory criteria for QHPs are phrased in 
 
212. See id. § 18031(d)(2)(B)(i) (“An Exchange may not make available 
any health plan that is not a qualified health plan.”). 
213. See id. § 18021(a)(1); see also id. § 18031(e) (providing that the 
exchanges are responsible for making QHP certifications). 
214. The exchanges also have authority to set the procedures that 
govern their certification processes. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.1010 (2012). 
215. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e). Exchanges also have authority to decertify 
plans as QHPs if they determine that the plan no longer meets the 
certification criteria. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.1080. 
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broad terms, and include a number of requirements of varying 
significance. QHPs must “meet marketing requirements,” not 
discourage enrollment by unhealthy individuals, “ensure 
sufficient choice of providers,” meet various performance 
criteria, employ a standard enrollment form, and report 
various quality metrics.216 
The statute explicitly contemplates that the criteria will be 
fleshed out through rulemaking, but the regulations provide 
little additional specificity. Significantly, however, they 
condition fulfillment of the statutory criteria on satisfaction of 
standards set by the exchanges. For example, the rule states 
that plans are not eligible to be certified if they do not comply 
with “any provisions imposed by the Exchange . . . that are 
conditions of participation . . . with respect to each of its 
QHPs,” or if the plan fails to adhere to the exchange’s 
certification process.217 Similarly, the rules condition 
certification on compliance with the Exchange’s network 
adequacy standards,218 termination of coverage 
requirements,219 and the carrier-level accreditation 
standards.220 In sum, even with respect to the statutory 
certification criteria, exchanges have significant responsibility 
to both define the standards that plans must meet and to 
evaluate their performance against those standards. 
The exchanges are also responsible for reviewing QHPs’ 
proposed rate increases.221 Upon receipt of a proposed rate 
increase, the exchange must decide whether to approve the 
increase.222 Neither the statute nor the proposed rules provide 
detailed guidance as to how the exchange should make this 
determination.223 The absence of more specific guidance 
 
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c). 
217. 45 C.F.R. § 156.200(d). 
218. See id. § 156.230. 
219. See id. § 156.270. 
220. See id. § 156.275. This accreditation process is based on the “local 
performance” of a plan’s QHPs in a number of areas, including clinical 
quality measures, patient experience, and utilization management 
performance. See id. 
221. See id. § 156.210 (requiring that QHPs submit proposed rate 
increases to the exchange). 
222. See id. § 155.1020. 
223. The statute provides only: 
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strongly suggests that the exchanges will have significant 
discretion to determine whether rate increases are sufficiently 
“justified” to allow a plan to remain on offer. 
If consumers participate in the exchanges in significant 
numbers, exchanges’ certification and rate review powers will 
give them de facto control over the individual and small-group 
markets. In essence, the exchanges have the ability, subject 
only to relatively narrow limits, to control entry into these 
markets. Viewed this way, the exchanges’ regulatory 
responsibilities closely resemble the states’ traditional 
licensing function.224 
 
2. Distribution 
 
Consistent with their intended function as health plan 
marketplaces, exchanges also have a significant amount of 
control over the way individuals purchase health coverage. 
Here again, the statute itself offers only sparse guidance as to 
how the exchange marketplaces will function. The few specific 
statutory requirements are mainly technical. The statute 
requires that the exchanges use a “uniform enrollment form,” 
developed by HHS, which may be submitted electronically or in 
 
 
The Exchange shall require health plans seeking 
certification as qualified health plans to submit a 
justification for any premium increase prior to 
implementation of the increase . . . . The Exchange shall 
take this information, and the information and the 
recommendations provided to the Exchange by the State . . . 
into consideration when determining whether to make such 
health plan available through the Exchange. The Exchange 
shall take into account any excess of premium growth 
outside the Exchange as compared to the rate of such 
growth inside the Exchange, including information reported 
by the States. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(2) (2012). The proposed regulation substantially 
duplicates this guidance. See QHP Issuer Rate and Benefit Information, 76 
Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41921 (proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. 
§ 155.1020). 
224. See supra Part II. 
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hard copy.225 Similarly, it mandates that exchanges use a 
standard format for the presentation of benefits,226 and that 
they assign a rating to each QHP offered through the 
exchange.227 In terms of how exchanges are to conduct 
transactions, the statute requires only that they maintain a 
hotline and a website.228 
HHS’ proposed regulations provide additional detail as to 
how the exchanges must operate. For example, the rules list 
the minimum amount of information that exchange websites 
must provide about each QHP, require that the website include 
a calculator to “facilitate the comparison of available QHPs,” 
and mandate that the website have a “consumer assistance 
function.”229 Similarly, the rules require that the exchanges 
include certain information on all correspondence, facilitate 
payment for coverage directly to the carrier, and meet various 
privacy standards.230 The rules also dictate the periods during 
the year when exchanges must allow consumers to switch 
between plans.231 
Nonetheless, within these relatively broad limits, 
exchanges enjoy considerable freedom to define the terms of 
consumers’ and plans’ interactions with the exchange. The 
exchanges are presumably free, for example, to staff their call 
centers as they see fit and to design the operation and 
appearance of their websites as they wish. Similarly, the 
exchanges are afforded broad discretion to set up “Navigator” 
programs, which are designed to create a group of 
intermediaries that will assist consumers in purchasing plans 
 
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1)(F). 
226. See id. § 18031(c)(1)(G). 
227. See id. § 18031(c)(1)(H). The statute requires that plans be rated 
bronze, silver, gold, or platinum based on their actuarial value. See id. 
§ 18022(d). 
228. See id. § 18031(d)(4). 
229. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.205 (2013). 
230. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of 
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41916 
(proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.230 to 155.260). 
231. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of 
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41917 
(proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.410). 
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through the exchange.232 Navigators are charged with 
educating the public about the exchange, distributing 
information on health plans, and assisting consumers with 
enrollment.233 Importantly, the exchanges have discretion to 
decide which organizations receive federal grants to become 
navigators.234 While these may seem like relatively mundane 
responsibilities, they will nonetheless define most of the 
consumer-facing aspects of the exchanges, and will likely have 
a significant impact on their ultimate success or failure. 
 
D. Multistate Licensing Provisions 
 
The statute also contains two provisions—both closely 
linked with the exchange-based plan-licensing scheme—that 
are designed to facilitate the creation of nationwide health 
plans. Both provisions displace portions of state regulatory 
authority in order to achieve this end. 
The first program, which provides for the creation of 
“Health Care Choice Compacts” (“HCCCs”) between states, is 
effectively optional.235 States can choose whether to enter into 
these compacts, which allow one state’s QHPs to be offered in 
all states that signed the compact.236 In addition to complying 
with the rules necessary to maintain their status as QHPs,237 
the carriers selling plans under the compact need to be licensed 
in each state where they offer a plan.238 Moreover, the plan 
“would continue to be subject to market conduct, unfair trade 
practices, network adequacy, and consumer protection 
standards (including standards relating to rating) . . . of the 
 
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i) (establishing Navigator program); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and 
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41915-16 (proposed July 15, 
2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.210). 
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i)(3). 
234. See Navigator Program Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41915-16 
(proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.210). 
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 18053(a). 
236. See id. § 18053(a)(1). The statute also requires that states wishing 
to take advantage of these compacts enact an enabling statute. 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 212-20 (describing the QHP 
criteria); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18053(a)(2). 
238. See id. § 18053(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
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State in which the purchaser resides.”239 Lastly, the compacts 
are subject to approval by HHS, which is charged with 
ensuring that the coverage and cost-sharing terms of the 
compact are “at least as” stringent as those in the ACA.240 The 
net effect of these requirements is that the HCCCs provide a 
means by which the states can effectively delegate their ability 
to license plans as QHPs to other member states. In other 
words, the compacts provide a means for states to coordinate 
with respect to the exchange-related ACA regulations while 
leaving other state-based regulatory functions intact. 
In contrast to the opt-in structure of the HCCCs, the ACA’s 
second multistate plan provision is mandatory. The statute’s 
“multi-State QHP” provision allows carriers to offer plans 
which may be sold in all states in which the carrier is 
licensed.241 In addition to meeting the single-state QHP 
requirements, these multi-State QHPs must offer a uniform 
benefits package in all states, must comply with each state 
exchange’s QHP requirements, and must adhere to all state 
laws that do not conflict with the multi-State QHP 
provisions.242 Although the multi-State QHP program does not 
entirely displace state law, it circumscribes its effect. The 
Office of Personnel Management, which is charged with 
administering the multi-State QHPs, has authority to 
determine whether state laws conflict with the requirements of 
the multi-State QHP program.243 Further, plans that meet the 
multi-State QHP requirement need not obtain QHP 
certification by every state exchange.244 In sum, the multi-State 
QHP plan provision enacts a form of national plan licensing 
 
239. Id. § 18053(a)(1)(B)(i). 
240. See id. § 18053(a)(3). 
241. See id. § 18054. 
242. See id. § 18054(b). The regulations associated with the multi-State 
QHP provision impose additional regulation covering benefits, levels of 
coverage, and network adequacy, among other topics. See 45 C.F.R. 
§§ 800.105 to 800.112. 
243. See 45 C.F.R. § 800.114(b); see also Timothy Jost, Implementing 
Health Reform: The Multi-State Plan Program Final Rule, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/03/02/implementing-health-reform-
the-multi-state-plan-program-final-rule/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) 
(characterizing state-law compliance as “the most sensitive issue” addressed 
by the multi-State QHP rulemaking process). 
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 18054(d). 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
  
2014] UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACA 325 
that displaces both traditional and exchange-based state 
regulation as a means of encouraging the development of 
national health plans. 
 
* * * 
 
A comparison of the health plan regulations in the ACA 
and the regulations traditionally imposed by states245 reveals a 
great degree of overlap. To date, however, the relationship 
between the exchanges and the allocation of regulatory 
authority over plans has escaped scholarly attention. The next 
Part of this paper turns to that relationship. 
 
VI. State Health Insurance Regulation after the ACA 
 
By any measure, the ACA heralds a significant shift of 
health insurance regulatory responsibility from the states to 
the federal government. As the discussion in Part VI makes 
clear, the Act touches upon nearly every aspect of the business 
of health insurance. Even in those areas that were already 
subject to federal regulation,246 the ACA provisions represent a 
step change in terms of stringency. 
The changes wrought by the Act beg an obvious question—
in a post-ACA world, which entities are responsible for which 
regulatory functions? This Part attempts to untangle this 
question. After setting out the general contours of the post-
ACA regulatory scheme, the balance of this Article turns to its 
implications. First, it discusses the similarities between the 
ACA and failed attempts to establish a regime of national 
insurance chartering, and how the ACA is in many ways a 
model for such a scheme. The Article concludes by arguing that 
it is a flawed model. By displacing large swaths of state 
insurance regulation through the unintended operation of the 
exchange provisions, the statute will sacrifice many benefits of 
state-based regulation. The fact that the statute works such 
significant changes virtually by accident should give 
proponents of greater regulatory centralization pause before 
 
245. See supra Part III. 
246. See supra Part IV.C. 
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they celebrate the ACA as a model regulatory regime. 
 
A. Where Does Regulatory Authority Reside after the ACA? 
 
The ACA’s delegation of authority to administer its 
regulatory requirements is complex. Table 1 provides a broad 
overview of where regulatory authority rests under the statute. 
HHS will assume direct authority over some aspects of health 
insurance regulation (column 1). In other areas the statute has 
left matters entirely to the states (column 2). Most important 
for purposes of this Article, however, are the functions assigned 
to the exchanges (column 3). States that create their own 
exchange will retain control of these functions. But in the 
twenty-six states that elected not to create exchanges, the 
federal government will assume control of the regulatory 
activities in column 3. 
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Table 1: Allocation of Regulatory Authority under the ACA 
 
Regulatory Function Regulator 
 
(1) States 
 
(2) HHS 
(3) 
Exchanges 
(State or 
Federal)247 
Solvency regulation 
   Carrier reserves √   
   Risk redistribution √ Temporary 
measures248 
 
Rating & underwriting 
   Definition of rating factors  √  
   Rate review   √ 
Market conduct 
   Guaranteed issue rules  √  
   Cost-sharing practices  √  
Plan content regulation 
   Benefits content Limited 
authority249 
√  
   Provider contracting √   
   Network standards   √ 
   Utilization management √   
Distribution 
   QHP certification   √ 
   Agent/broker regulation √   
   Consumer experience   √ 
   Plan marketing          
   practices 
  √ 
 
 
 
247. As discussed above, these functions default to a federally run 
exchange in the event that a state fails to establish its own exchange. See 
supra text accompanying note 180. As of this writing, twenty-six states have 
failed to establish an exchange, leaving the federal government to establish 
an exchange covering half the country. See supra note 177. 
248. See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text. 
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B) (2012) (allowing states to 
supplement plan content requirements provided they assume the associated 
cost for certain individuals). 
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Several things stand out about this new allocation of 
regulatory authority. First, the areas of authority that remain 
the sole province of the states are those that are relatively 
technical in nature. Solvency regulation—which consists 
primarily of imposing reserve requirements on carriers—is the 
area that remains most firmly under state control.250 In one 
sense, this is unsurprising. As described in Part II, solvency 
regulation is a core competency of state insurance regulators. 
Solvency regulation is largely the same across different lines of 
insurance, and was the first aspect of the insurance industry to 
be subject to regulation. The federal government, by contrast, 
has relatively little experience regulating the solvency of 
insurance carriers, which differs in important respects from 
solvency regulation of other financial services industries.251 
Provider contracting is another aspect of the health 
insurance business that remains primarily within the states’ 
regulatory jurisdiction. As is the case with solvency, one could 
imagine why Congress might have left provider-contracting 
regulation to the states; provider contracting resembles 
garden-variety commercial law relationships, which are defined 
by state law. However, the reality is a bit more complicated. 
One of the stated goals of the ACA was controlling the costs of 
health care, and the contractual relationships between 
insurance carriers and providers are a core driver of those 
costs. Indeed, many have convincingly argued that reforming 
these payment relationships is the best way to deal with the 
problem of rising health care costs.252 Utilization management, 
which is also left primarily to state regulation, is another 
 
250. The ACA’s measures for allocating the risks associated with 
guaranteed issue between carriers could also be classified as solvency 
regulations. Insofar as these rules are creations of the ACA, however, they do 
not disturb states’ traditional role. See supra notes 210-211 and 
accompanying text. 
251. Cf. John Patrick Hunt, Rating Dependent Regulation of Insurance, 
17 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 104-05, 110-27 (2010) (explaining that the 
justifications for solvency regulation in insurance are different from the 
“systemic contagion” risks that animate banking solvency regulation, and 
highlighting challenges posed by the 2008 financial crisis). 
252. See, e.g., Steven A. Schroeder & William Frist, Phasing Out Fee-for-
Service Payment, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029-30, 2032 (2013) 
(“Controlling rising expenditures for health care will not occur without 
changing the way that physicians are paid.”). 
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critical means of controlling costs. Much like provider 
contracting, there does not seem to be a clear technocratic or 
political economy justification for leaving regulation of this 
function to the states. 
Viewed this way, assigning regulatory authority over these 
areas to the states seems like an odd choice. If cost control is 
indeed a key objective of the ACA, it is not clear why Congress 
would allow the states to continue to control contracting. One 
possible explanation is that the ACA does not heavily regulate 
in these areas because the statute, as actually passed, does not 
attempt to deal as comprehensively with the problem of health 
care cost as originally imagined. Accounts of the debates over 
drafts of the ACA support this hypothesis.253 Perhaps, then, 
regulation of these areas was to be addressed in a different 
part of the statute that never came to fruition. 
Another common aspect of those areas left to state 
regulation is that they lack political salience. Insurer rate 
reserves, provider contracting, and utilization management—
whatever their importance to the actual functioning of a health 
insurance carrier—are not the stuff of headlines.254 If one 
subscribes to the view that legislating is politically costly—
particularly when done in the context of a heated partisan 
battle—then perhaps Congress simply felt that addressing 
these areas of regulation was not worth the required political 
capital.255 Under this account, few voters would notice whether 
these items were included in the bill, suggesting that any 
political gains to be had would be modest at best, but that 
missteps—which would greatly aggravate the insurance 
industry—would be costly. Conversely, many of the areas that 
Congress shifted to HHS’ regulatory jurisdiction are politically 
significant. Plan pricing, guaranteed issue, employer cost 
sharing, and the benefit design of plans all directly impact 
 
253. See, e.g., Stephen M. Weiner, Payment Reform After PPACA: Is 
Massachusetts Leading the Way Again?, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
33, 34 (2011). 
254. See Detlefsen, supra note 133, at 104 (noting that solvency 
regulation is “technical and straightforward,” and does not implicate the 
social-welfare questions raised by other aspects of insurance regulation). 
255. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: 
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative 
Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 11-12 (2008). 
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consumers. Not coincidentally, reforms in these areas were the 
ones most trumpeted by lawmakers after the passage of the 
Act. 
A third notable characteristic of the ACA’s allocation of 
regulatory authority is that the functions Congress delegated 
to HHS are those with which the federal government has the 
most familiarity. As discussed in Part IV, the federal 
government has had a hand in regulating market conduct in 
the individual and group markets since at least 1996.256 
Congress’ experience with HIPAA (and also the carriers’ 
experiences) may have emboldened it to regulate more 
extensively in this area. As veterans of the HIPAA debates, 
many of the members of the relevant committees of Congress 
likely had greater familiarity with these market-conduct issues 
than with other aspects of the statute. Moreover, HHS had the 
benefit of fifteen years of promulgating market-conduct 
regulations, perhaps increasing Congress’ confidence in HHS’ 
ability to be an effective regulator. Lastly, the states may have 
been less likely to resist further incursion into these aspects of 
their regulatory jurisdiction, as the HIPAA provisions had 
already reduced their degrees of freedom. 
The last thing that stands out about the ACA’s distribution 
of regulatory functions is the significant role of the exchanges. 
It is not immediately apparent why Congress thought it 
appropriate to confer these functions—almost of all of which lie 
within the traditional domain of state regulation—on the 
exchanges. More significantly, it is unclear whether Congress 
considered how much of the balance of federal and state 
regulatory authority effectively rested on states’ decisions 
whether to establish an exchange. 
One obvious possibility is that Congress thought it was 
leaving these functions with the states. That is, Congress fully 
expected most states would decide to operate their own 
exchange, which would effectively leave them in control of 
these functions. But this account is unsatisfying. First, if 
Congress wanted the states to perform these functions, why tie 
them to the exchanges at all, instead of just remaining silent 
about them? Second, in light of the political climate 
 
256. See supra Part IV.B. 
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/7
  
2014] UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACA 331 
surrounding the passage of the Act, it seems implausible that 
Congress did not anticipate the possibility that states would 
opt out of the exchanges. Thus, it seems unlikely that the 
choice to vest the exchanges with these functions was in any 
way accidental. 
A second possibility is that Congress simply modeled the 
provisions after the archetypal exchange—the Massachusetts 
Health Connector—and gave the exchanges these functions 
because that is what Massachusetts did.257 This too seems 
unlikely. For one thing, section 1321 of the ACA creates a 
presumption that exchanges operated by states before January 
1, 2010 comply with the ACA’s requirements, but it also 
provides for a review by the HHS Secretary to ensure 
compliance.258 Thus, Congress at least entertained the 
possibility that the Massachusetts exchange would differ in 
meaningful ways from the statutory criteria. Further, the 
exchanges were a widely publicized and debated aspect of the 
ACA—it is therefore unlikely that Congress blindly applied the 
Massachusetts model. A third possibility is that Congress 
simply decided that these functions would be best performed by 
the exchanges as independent entities. But the plain terms of 
the Act, which characterize the exchanges as a state flexibility 
measure,259 strongly suggest that Congress viewed the 
exchanges as instrumentalities of the States. 
Regardless of its reasons for vesting regulatory authority 
in the exchanges, the fact that Congress did so raises an 
important question: how did Congress think this allocation of 
regulatory authority would interact with the states’ freedom to 
opt out of creating their own exchange? The next section 
canvasses the legislative history of the ACA for answers to this 
question. 
 
B. The Legislative History of the ACA’s Exchange Provision 
 
The ACA’s drafting history offers few clues as to how 
Congress believed the Act’s exchange provisions would impact 
 
257. See Weiner, supra note 253, at 34-36. 
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(e) (2012). 
259. See id. §§ 18041 to 18044. 
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state regulatory authority. Much of what one can glean about 
the exchanges from this history relates to the different versions 
of the exchange provision drafted by the House and the Senate. 
 
1. The House Bill’s Exchange Provisions 
 
The version of the ACA that passed the House, called the 
“Affordable Health Care for America Act,” contained a 
dramatically different exchange provision than the provision 
that Congress ultimately enacted. Rather than providing for 
multiple state-based exchanges, the House bill created a single 
federal exchange.260 This federal exchange was to perform 
many of the same functions of the state-based exchanges that 
were included in the ACA. For example, plans that were to be 
sold on the exchange had to meet requirements regarding the 
level of benefits offered,261 and the exchange was to perform a 
plan certification function.262 Like the ACA as ultimately 
passed, the exchange-related regulatory provisions in the 
House bill covered both the content of health plans and the 
manner in which they could be sold. Thus, the bill included 
requirements affecting cost sharing, enrollment, risk pooling, 
network adequacy, and compliance with state carrier licensure 
rules.263 
These provisions were consistent with lawmakers’ 
comments regarding the purpose of the exchange. The House 
Ways and Means Committee, for example, took an expansive 
view of the role of the exchange: 
 
A Health Insurance Exchange . . . would be 
established to facilitate access of individuals and 
employers to a variety of choices of affordable, 
quality health insurance coverage, including a 
public health insurance option. . . . As described 
 
260. See Affordable Health Care for America Act (AHCAA), H.R. 3962, 
111th Cong. § 301(a) (2009). 
261. See id. § 303 (requiring, inter alia, that plans be branded in three 
tiers based on benefit levels, and that plans adhere to cost-sharing limits). 
262. See id. § 304 (granting the exchange commissioner the power to 
establish and enforce certification criteria). 
263. See id. §§ 303 to 304. 
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in greater detail in the following sections,. . . the 
[Exchange] Commissioner would (1) establish 
standards for, accept bids from, and negotiate 
and enter into contracts with entities seeking to 
offer qualified health benefits plans (QHBPs) 
through the Exchange, (2) facilitate outreach and 
enrollment of Exchange-eligible individuals and 
employers, and (3) conduct appropriate activities 
related to the Exchange, including establishment 
of a risk pooling mechanism and consumer 
protections.264 
 
As this quotation makes clear, the House envisioned that the 
exchange would do more than simply allow consumers to enroll 
in a plan—it would play a central role in defining the set of 
choices available to consumers, and would also undertake 
certain functions—like risk pooling—that had long been the 
province of state regulators. 
Another notable aspect of the federal exchange proposed in 
the House bill is the extent to which it is intertwined with the 
proposed “public option.” The public option was a hotly 
contested aspect of the House bill that created a government-
run health plan that would compete with private carriers’ 
plans on the federal exchange.265 Both the structure of the 
House bill—which places the exchange and public-option 
provisions adjacent to each other—and House Committee 
Reports suggest that the exchange and the public option were 
closely related.266 This connection is perhaps unsurprising. The 
 
264. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 3200, H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-299, pt. 2, at 229 (2009). Both the House Education and Labor 
Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee took a nearly identical 
view. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR ON H.R. 3200, H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-299, pt. 3, at 116-17 (2009); REPORT OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND 
COMMERCE ON H.R. 3200, H.R. REP. 111-299, pt. 1, at 402 (2009). 
265. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th 
Cong. §§ 321 to 331 (2009) (providing for the creation and administration of 
the public health insurance option). The public option proved to be one of the 
most controversial proposals debated as part of the health reform package, 
and was not included in the Senate bills or the ACA as passed. 
266. For a non-exhaustive list of examples where the House highlighted 
the relationship between the exchange and the public option, see H.R. REP. 
111-299, at 318, 470, 402; H.R. REP. 111-299, at 78, 91, 95-96, 126; H.R. REP. 
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exchange was to be the sole means through which consumers 
could purchase plans under the public option, suggesting that 
Congress viewed the national exchange as an indispensable 
component of the public plan.267 
Moreover, the bill suggests that the exchange regulations 
were to form the basis upon which the public option would be 
permitted to compete with private plans.268 Congress 
envisioned that the public option would simply be one choice 
among many—a federally sponsored plan that would compete 
on level terms with private offerings.269 In order for this 
competition to be “fair,” the statute needed a yardstick against 
which to measure the content of both the public option plan 
and the private plans. The exchange’s certification processes 
provided this yardstick.270 Without this shared regulatory 
framework, it would have been difficult to determine whether 
public option plans were truly comparable to those offered in 
the private market. 
The House bill did contain an alternative to the federal 
exchange. Under section 308 of the bill, states could apply for 
permission to create their own exchanges to replace the federal 
exchange in their state.271 Even this provision, however, 
conferred only limited authority on the states. The 
Commissioner in charge of the federal exchange was vested 
with the power to approve or deny the creation of state 
exchanges.272 The bill sets out several conditions for this 
approval, but also grants the Commissioner tremendous 
discretion to determine whether a state exchange passes 
muster: it subjects approval to compliance with “[s]uch other 
 
111-299, at 198, 201-02, 229, 239. 
267. See Affordable Health Care for America Act (AHCAA), H.R. 3962, 
111th Cong. § 321(b)(1) (2009) (“The public health insurance option shall only 
be made available through the Health Insurance Exchange.”). 
268. See id. § 100(a)(3)(B). 
269. See id. 
270. Id. § 321(b)(2) (the “public health insurance option shall comply 
with requirements that are applicable under this title to an Exchange-
participating health benefits plan, including requirements related to benefits, 
benefit levels, provider networks, notices, consumer protections, and cost-
sharing.”). 
271. See id. § 308. 
272. See id. 
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requirements as the Commissioner may specify.”273 Moreover, 
even after the Commissioner approves a state exchange, the 
Commissioner retains authority to define which functions the 
state exchange may perform and which will remain under 
federal control.274 
In sum, the House’s exchange provisions suggested a 
model in which the federal government would use its exchange 
to exercise a significant degree of control over both the terms of 
plans available to consumers and the means through which 
consumers could enroll in them. Far from being a means of 
allowing states to retain regulatory control or flexibility, the 
single federal exchange was to be a means imposing 
uniformity, in part to carry the new public option into 
operation. Under the House bill, the exchange had little to do 
with balancing state and federal regulatory authority. Rather, 
the bill as a whole envisioned a near-complete shift of that 
authority to the federal government, with the exchange serving 
as the vehicle through which the federal government would 
exercise its new authority. By contrast, the Senate bill—and 
the ACA as eventually passed—eschewed the creation of a 
national exchange, seemingly intending to vest the exchanges’ 
powers in the states. 
 
 
 
 
273. Id. § 308(b)(1)(E). 
274. See id. § 308(d). The Bill defines the Commissioner’s relationship to 
approved state exchanges as follows: 
 
(d) RETENTION OF AUTHORITY.— 
(1) AUTHORITY RETAINED.—Enforcement authorities of 
the Commissioner shall be retained by the Commissioner. 
(2) DISCRETION TO RETAIN ADDITIONAL 
AUTHORITY.—The Commissioner may specify functions of 
the Health Insurance Exchange that— 
(A) may not be performed by a State-based Health 
Insurance Exchange under this section; or 
(B) may be performed by the Commissioner and by 
such a State-based Health Insurance Exchange. 
 
Id. 
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2. The Senate Bill’s Exchange Provisions 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that it formed the basis of 
the engrossed bill, the Senate bill’s exchange provisions closely 
track those in the ACA as enacted. Indeed, the Conference 
Committee made no significant changes to the Senate bill’s 
exchange provisions.275 Given this similarity, evidence of what 
the Senate thought regarding the consequences of states failing 
to establish their own exchanges is highly probative of the 
Congress’ ultimate views about the ACA and state regulatory 
authority. 
Unfortunately, the history of the Senate bill reveals little 
about what Congress thought would happen if states did not 
create their own exchanges. The most useful commentary on 
this point is from the Senate Finance Committee’s report: “If 
states do not establish these exchanges within 2 years of 
enactment (or if the Secretary determines the exchanges will 
not be operational by July 1, 2013), the Secretary would be 
required to contract with a nongovernmental entity to establish 
the exchanges within the state.”276 This comment suggests that 
the Committee did not necessarily imagine that the alternative 
to a state-based exchange would be a federal one; rather, it 
suggests that the federal government would set up a state 
exchange to be run by an entity other than the uncooperative 
state government. This implies that the Committee imagined 
that exchange regulations would remain state specific, and 
provides some support for the notion that the Senate did not 
expect the optional character of the exchanges to have a 
significant effect on the distribution of regulatory authority 
between the state and federal government. 
This inference is consistent with a provision in the version 
of the bill reported out of the Finance Committee that provided 
for contractual allocation of exchange functions between the 
 
275. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, PUB. L. 
NO. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.); see also Farhana Hossain, Proposed Changes to the Final Health 
Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/19/us/politics/20100319-health-
care-reconciliation.html?_r=0#tab=1 (last updated Mar. 22, 2010). 
276. S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 18-19 (2009). 
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federal government, the states, and their exchanges.277 The 
provision, which was dropped from the version of the bill 
ultimately approved by the Senate, provided: “The Secretary 
shall enter into an agreement with each State (in this section 
referred to as the ‘agreement’) setting forth which of the 
functions described in this section with respect to an exchange 
shall be performed by the Secretary, the State, or the 
exchange.”278 Critically, this sentence was in the section of the 
bill that described all of the major functions of the exchanges: 
plan certification, establishment of a call center and internet 
portal, establishment of tiered ratings for plans, administration 
of eligibility criteria, and enrollment.279 Neither the bill nor the 
Committee Report elaborates the required terms of an 
agreement to allocate these functions. 
Whatever its contours, the existence of the agreement 
provision suggests that the Committee imagined states would 
have the express option to retain control of the exchange-
administered functions. Indeed, under this provision, it 
appears that a state would have had the option—subject to the 
federal government’s assent—to pick those exchange functions 
the state wished to assume and to effectively delegate the 
others to the federal government. At a minimum, this impulse 
seems at odds with the way the ACA’s exchange provisions 
have played out in practice—as a take-it-or-leave-it option that 
demands states either create their own exchange or forfeit 
regulatory authority to HHS. 
To recap, the legislative history of the ACA reveals little 
about what Congress understood about the impact of the 
exchange provisions on state regulatory authority. At best, the 
differences between the House and Senate bills—which 
revolved around whether there would be one or more 
exchanges—suggest that the question of state regulatory 
jurisdiction was orthogonal to the issues at the fore of 
Congressional minds. Regardless of what Congress intended, 
however, the exchange provisions (and the ACA more broadly) 
 
277. See America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. 
§ 2236 (2009). 
278. Id. § 2236(a). 
279. See id. § 2236(b)-(d). 
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do considerably alter the scope of state regulatory authority. 
The next section turns to the consequences of this shift. 
 
C. A Step Toward Federal Insurance Chartering? 
 
As discussed above, the ACA’s assignment of regulatory 
functions confers authority over most of the politically salient 
aspects of health insurance regulation to HHS, assigns the 
bulk of the consumer-facing functions to the exchanges, and 
leaves several technical areas within state purview. The 
reasons why Congress wanted to federalize the politically 
sensitive judgments seems relatively clear—regulation of topics 
like rating and guaranteed issue is an essential element of the 
statute’s goal of expanding health coverage to the entire 
population. The legislative history of the exchange provisions 
suggests that the assignment of the exchange-related 
regulatory functions was less deliberate, as Congress did not 
seem to contemplate the possibility that the states would fail to 
set up their own exchanges. Nonetheless, that legislative 
history rightly suggests that the functions assigned to the 
exchanges are important ones, and will have a significant 
impact on the overall health insurance market. In sum, the 
ACA has created a system where the federal government 
controls many of the core aspects of health insurance 
regulation. And in half of the states—those that have not 
established their own exchanges—it will control nearly every 
regulatory function, save solvency, provider contracting, and 
utilization management. 
What then are the implications of this new order? The 
balance of this paper suggests that the ACA has created a 
scheme that resembles one envisaged by proposals to create an 
optional federal insurance chartering system. After briefly 
summarizing the content of these proposals, the paper 
concludes with a discussion of the long-term consequences of 
the ACA’s regulatory scheme. 
 
1. Optional Federal Insurance Chartering 
 
For at least the last forty years, there has been an ongoing 
debate between carriers, states, and the federal government 
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about whether the insurance industry and consumers are well 
served by state regulation.280 Specifically, the debate has been 
about whether the United States should regulate insurance the 
way it regulates the banking, securities, and other financial 
industries, all of which are primarily subject to federal 
regulation. 
Criticism of the state-based system proceeds along two 
lines. First, some carriers contend that state regulation forces 
them to navigate an unduly complex patchwork of sometimes-
conflicting state regulations, which raises costs and makes it 
difficult to do business across state lines.281 Under this view, 
there are significant economies of scale to be achieved by 
standardizing regulatory requirements, which would allow 
carriers to reduce their spending on compliance.282 Moreover, 
proponents of this view argue that standardizing regulatory 
requirements would greatly ease carriers’ ability to bring new 
products to market, which will result in innovation that 
benefits both carriers and consumers.283 Lastly, the argument 
goes, society receives little benefit from the heterogeneity of 
insurance regulations, suggesting that the regulations cost 
carriers dearly and benefit consumers little.284 
The second set of criticisms of state-based insurance 
regulation comes from a different direction. Some have argued 
that it has been an uneven protector of consumers’ interests. 
Specifically, the system has been criticized as failing to provide 
adequate information to consumers, to ensure that insurance 
 
280. The first serious discussion of federal insurance chartering dates to 
1969. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 91; see also Martin F. Grace & 
Robert W. Klein, The Future of Insurance Regulation: An Introduction, in 
THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, 
at 1-4 (situating the federal chartering debate in the context of arguments 
about the proper allocation of regulatory authority dating to the Civil War). 
281. See Elizabeth F. Brown, Will the Federal Insurance Office Improve 
Insurance Regulation?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 560-79 (2012) (summarizing, 
in the context of CDO regulation, criticisms of state insurance regulation); 
Grace & Scott, supra note 129, at 58-66; Ernest T. Patrikis, Optional Federal 
Chartering for Property and Casualty Companies, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL 
CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 47, 47-50 (Peter J. 
Wallison ed., 2000); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 96-101. 
282. See Grace & Scott, supra note 129, at 60. 
283. See id. at 66. 
284. See id. at 61. 
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markets are competitive, to effectively regulate brokers and 
other producers, and to enforce regulations when they are 
violated.285 
Many have suggested that the best way to solve these 
problems would be to create a system of optional federal 
insurance chartering.286 Under such a scheme, which would be 
modeled on the system of banking regulation,287 carriers would 
have the option to either continue under the current scheme of 
state licensing or to apply for a single federal license.288 Of 
course, any federal chartering system would enlarge the role of 
federal regulators at the expense of the states. 
A brief overview of the components of an optional federal 
insurance chartering system suggests the ways in which such a 
system resembles the ACA. The most recent legislative attempt 
to establish a federal chartering system provides a useful 
example of how a federal chartering system would work. 
The 2007 National Insurance Act (“NIA”) was a bill 
considered—and ultimately abandoned—in the United States 
Senate.289 The NIA, which would have been a major overhaul of 
non-health insurance regulation, sought “to establish a 
comprehensive system of Federal chartering, licensing, 
regulation, and supervision for insurers and insurance 
producers that is independent of the State system . . . , yet that 
requires federally chartered and licensed insurers and 
producers to comply with certain State laws, including State 
tax laws.”290 The NIA proposed an “Office of National 
Insurance,” which was to oversee all aspects of federal 
 
285. See J. Robert Hunter, A Consumer Perspective, in OPTIONAL 
FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 
281, at 177, 182-84. But see Grace & Scott, supra note 129, at 72-73 (noting 
that a federal regulator may be less attentive to consumer needs than local 
regulators, which may be held more directly accountable for their 
responsiveness to citizen queries). 
286. Cf. Randall, supra note 15, at 628, 687 (arguing that in the absence 
of a move to federal chartering, the current state-based regulatory system 
should be reformed). 
287. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 94. 
288. See id. at 96 (summarizing carrier’s licensing options under the 
proposed 2007 National Insurance Act). 
289. National Insurance Act of 2007, S. 40, 110th Cong. (2007). 
290. Id. § 2. 
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insurance regulation and issue the new national charters.291 
The agency would have power to regulate policy forms, which 
include the definition of policy terms, solvency standards, 
underwriting standards, and sales and marketing practices.292 
In other words, the agency would exercise almost all of the 
powers traditionally reserved to state regulators. Importantly, 
the Act would displace state regulation of national insurers in 
these areas: 
 
Except as authorized by this Act or otherwise 
authorized under Federal law, national insurers, 
national agencies, and federally licensed 
insurance producers shall not be subject to any 
form of licensing, examination, reporting, 
regulation, or other supervision relating to— 
(1) the sale, solicitation, or negotiation of 
insurance; 
(2) the underwriting of insurance; or 
(3) any other insurance operations.293 
 
The ACA resembles the National Insurance Act system in 
a number of important respects. As discussed above,294 the 
ACA contains a provision authorizing the creation of multi-
State QHPs. Recall that states are obliged to allow these plans 
to operate within their jurisdiction.295 Recall also that these 
QHPs are subject only to regulations imposed by state 
exchanges and state laws that do not conflict with the ACA’s 
multi-State QHP requirements.296 When considered alongside 
 
291. See id. §§ 1101 to 02. 
292. See id. §§ 1212, 1214 to 15; see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 
95-98 (summarizing the key terms of the bill). Interestingly, the agency 
would not have the authority to regulate rating practices. See S. 40, 110th 
Cong. § 1215(d) (“The Act does not authorize the Commissioner to require a 
national insurer to use any particular rate, rating element, price, or form.”). 
Coupled with the Act’s preemption prevision, this section of the bill would 
appear to preclude all regulation of property and casualty rating practices. 
See id. § 1703. 
293. Id. § 1125(a). 
294. See supra Part V.D. 
295. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
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the fact that the federal government will run an exchange 
serving half the states—making it a natural choice for plans 
seeking QHP certification—the system very closely resembles 
the NIA’s federal licensure scheme. To wit, plans can opt either 
to pursue licensing on a state-by-state basis, either through the 
individual state exchanges or outside the exchanges through 
pre-ACA regulatory processes, or may opt to seek certification 
as a multi-State QHP through the federal exchange.297 
Importantly, the fact that the federal government will be 
running its own exchange means that this power—which would 
have belonged to the states—is shared with the federal 
government. Moreover, if multi-State QHP issuers wish to 
standardize their offerings as much as possible, as the debate 
about federal chartering suggests they will,298 the federal 
exchange will have far more influence than any single state, as 
it will set plan standards in twenty-six states. 
Beyond plan licensing, there are other similarities between 
the ACA and the NIA scheme. Many of the functions performed 
by the ACA exchanges, which regulate the consumer-facing 
aspects of the insurance business, resemble functions that 
would be vested in a federal consumer protection regulator 
under the NIA.299 The federally run exchange will in effect 
function as such a federal consumer protection regulator in 
twenty-six states. 
There are, however, several notable differences between 
the ACA and the NIA. As noted above, the ACA does not 
undertake regulation of carrier solvency, which represents a 
significant component of the NIA.300 Further, the NIA does not 
undertake regulation of health-specific insurance issues, such 
as guaranteed issue rules or employer cost sharing 
 
297. See supra Part V.D. 
298. See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text. Note that the ACA’s 
provision allowing the establishment of multi-State QHPs will also encourage 
standardization, at least among the largest carriers. See supra notes 241-42 
and accompanying text. 
299. See S. 40, 110th Cong. §§ 1105, 1216 (2007) (establishing a 
“Division of Consumer Affairs” within the Office of National Insurance 
charged with regulating sales and marketing practices); ZIMMERMAN, supra 
note 29, at 97-98 (summarizing consumer-protection aspects of the NIA). 
300. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text; S. 40, 110th Cong. 
§§ 1212 to 13, 1601 to 12. 
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requirements. Lastly, the ACA does not include a sweeping 
express preemption provision like that in the NIA. 
Nonetheless, the broad strokes of both statutory schemes are 
quite similar. 
 
2. A View of the Future? 
 
Situating the ACA in the context of the NIA and broader 
debates about the propriety of state-based insurance regulation 
highlights the extent to which the ACA represents a marked 
change in the health insurance regulatory landscape. As the 
Act is carried into implementation over the next few years, 
beginning with the commencement of exchange operations in 
October 2013, it is likely to have a significant impact on the 
future of state health insurance regulation and on the 
regulation of insurance more broadly. 
First, the ACA will function as a proof-of-concept of federal 
insurance chartering. As discussed above, the federally run 
exchange that will operate in twenty-six states,301 along with 
the Act’s multistate licensing provisions,302 effectively create a 
federal plan licensing option. If this option proves to be popular 
with carriers and consumers, it will lend support to the 
proponents of federal insurance chartering, both in health 
insurance and in other lines. Carriers’ perception of this option 
will be particularly important. If the regime lowers their 
regulatory compliance costs and makes it easier for them to 
offer plans across state lines, that experience may embolden 
non-health carriers to push harder for a similar regime in other 
insurance markets. With respect to health insurance, if 
carriers and consumers prefer the federally run exchanges to 
state-offered options, this may create pressure over the long 
term to converge on a single federal exchange. This end could 
be achieved either by amending the ACA to make it more 
closely resemble the House version of the Act, or by states 
simply opting to shut down their exchanges. Thus, the ACA 
will serve as a testing ground for optional federal insurance 
chartering. 
 
301. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra Part V.D. 
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Second, between the functions the ACA directly vests in 
HHS and those it vests in the exchanges (which the federal 
government will assume in half the states), the ACA will force 
the federal government to build competency in insurance 
regulation. While there have been proposals, like those in the 
NIA, for the federal government to assume insurance 
regulation functions, the ACA marks the first time that the 
federal government will actually have to build these 
capabilities. If history is any guide, the creation of this 
expertise at the federal level may lead to a further expansion of 
federal regulatory authority in the future. Consider, for 
example, the relationship between HIPAA’s insurance market 
reforms and the provisions of the ACA. Many of the areas 
where the ACA most dramatically expanded the federal 
government’s role—such as rating, guaranteed issue, and risk 
pooling in the individual and small-group markets—are areas 
where HIPAA had already established some form of federal 
regulation.303 By contrast, areas where the federal government 
had no prior regulatory role—such as the regulation of 
insurance producers—were left to the states. If this pattern 
holds true with respect to the federal regulatory capabilities 
created by the ACA, Congress may be more comfortable 
creating an expanded federal role in these areas through future 
legislation. 
Lastly, the ACA may mark the beginning of a gradual 
erosion of the role of state insurance regulators.304 If indeed the 
national licensing provisions and the federal exchange prove 
popular, an increasing proportion of the individual and small-
group business may shift to these federal channels. As noted 
earlier, these markets are the only significant portions of the 
health insurance business that remain under state control 
after ERISA.305 Thus, should these areas shift to a system of 
federal regulation, states would be left to regulate very little of 
the health insurance market. Moreover, as suggested earlier, 
 
303. See supra Part IV.C. 
304. Cf. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 17-18 
(“The specific activities CMS will undertake in each of the state-based and 
partnership exchanges may continue to change if states do not make 
adequate progress toward completion of their required activities.”). 
305. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. 
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the success of federal regulation in the health insurance 
business may generate pressure for federal chartering in 
property and casualty and other lines of insurance. Currently, 
regulation of these other lines is the bread-and-butter of state 
insurance agencies, but it is not implausible—especially in 
light of the NIA and other federal chartering efforts—that 
these functions may one day migrate to a federal agency. The 
ACA may be the beginning of that process. 
 
D. An Accidental—and Flawed—Model 
 
Consumers and insurance carriers both stand to lose a 
great deal by a shift toward federal regulation. The loss is 
clearest in health insurance. Many aspects of health insurance 
make it an ideal candidate for state-based regulation. In some 
ways, the ACA’s allocation of regulatory authority reflects this 
reality. Some of the elements of health insurance regulation 
that would benefit most from state-based authority, such as 
rate review, plan certification, and regulation of marketing 
practices, are assigned to the exchanges. 
Allowing these functions to quietly shift to the federal 
government because of states’ failure to create their own 
exchanges would be a mistake. Federal administration of these 
functions, even if only in half the states at the outset, will 
quickly result in greater homogenization. As discussed above, 
this will stymie the trial-and-error process of regulatory 
innovation in the states, degrade consumers’ and firms’ ability 
to influence the content of regulation, result in less-efficient 
regulation, and forego the benefits of state experience.306 Worse 
yet, the benefits normally associated with regulatory 
standardization, such as reduced compliance costs, ease of 
doing business across state lines, and consistent consumer 
protection standards,307 are unlikely to materialize under the 
ACA. A federal exchange will set standards for roughly half of 
the states, but the remaining twenty-four states will remain 
free to adopt their own, potentially conflicting rules. This kind 
of regulatory clash is all but assured, as the PPACA’s exchange 
 
306. See supra Part III.D. 
307. See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text. 
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provisions do not contain any preemption clauses that would 
displace conflicting state laws. Even states served by the 
federal exchange could, in some areas, adopt conflicting rules. 
The resulting regulatory collision will blunt any positive 
impacts of standardization, leaving behind a worst-of-both-
worlds outcome in which the benefits of state regulation are 
sacrificed for naught. 
Even those who do not subscribe to the view that there is 
value in regulatory federalism should be concerned that the 
ACA’s provisions work an unintended shift of authority to the 
federal government. It may be that such a shift is tolerable, 
even desirable, but it is difficult to say for sure without 
debating the alternatives. This is particularly true given there 
is no inherent reason why all of the functions assigned to the 
exchanges must be administered by the same regulator. For 
example, one could imagine a regime in which the states 
maintain control over provider contracting, but the federal 
government handles consumer-protection issues like plan 
certification and marketing regulation. The accidental nature 
of the ACA’s allocation of regulatory authority all but precludes 
consideration of this and other alternatives. 
As for non-health lines of insurance, proponents of a 
federal charter should pause before they trumpet the ACA as a 
model of what might work elsewhere. If indeed health 
insurance regulation starts to resemble the NIA scheme, it will 
be by accident, and not by design. If there is to be a broader 
shift to federal regulation of insurance, it ought to be 
deliberate. 
 
* * * 
 
Perhaps, then, Mississippi insurance commissioner Mike 
Chaney was right: Governor Bryant’s refusal to set up a state 
exchange in an effort to score political points for opposing the 
implementation of the ACA was shortsighted. What Governor 
Bryant and others failed to appreciate was that issues of much 
greater significance turned on the decision whether to create 
an exchange. Lost in the shuffle of debates about the public 
option and efforts to stymie the implementation of 
“Obamacare,” the significance of the exchanges to the broader 
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allocation of insurance regulatory authority seems to have 
escaped attention. This oversight will prove consequential in 
the health insurance industry, which will experience a 
reallocation of authority from the states to the federal 
government. It may also catalyze a broader erosion of state 
regulatory authority. There is good reason to think that these 
changes are wrongheaded. At minimum, however, they should 
not be undertaken blindly. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The ACA’s health insurance regulation provisions make 
clear that the Act works a transformation of the institutional 
structure of health insurance regulation. As the ACA takes full 
effect over the next year, the federal government, either 
through HHS or the new federal exchange, will assume 
responsibility for a significant portion of the regulation of 
health insurance. Rate review, rating regulations, plan benefit 
design, network standards, market-conduct requirements, and 
consumer-facing distribution will all come under a significant 
degree of federal control. 
Significantly, much of this authority will be exercised 
through the new federal exchange. By providing the states the 
option whether to create their own exchange—a choice made in 
the name of preserving state authority—Congress thus paved 
the way for a more dramatic shift in regulatory authority than 
it likely intended. In fact, the defeat of the House’s version of 
the Act—and its overt federalization of the exchange 
functions—signaled a desire to avoid precisely this result. 
Regardless of whether it is the product of careful design or 
unintended consequences, the presence of a federal exchange in 
half the states, along with the ACA’s other regulatory 
provisions, will represent a clear departure from the past 
century of insurance regulation. In health insurance markets, 
this shift will be costly. At best, consumers and carriers will 
lose the benefits associated with a state-based regulatory 
regime, but will not gain the benefits of a uniform national 
system. At worst, they may experience market disruptions 
caused by an inexperienced federal regulator. And it is likely 
that the effects of the ACA will not be limited to health 
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insurance. It may come to pass that Congress’ decision to 
provide states with flexibility, and Republican Governors’ 
attempt to use that flexibility to frustrate federal regulatory 
expansion, may form the unlikely crucible of a new regime of 
national insurance regulation. 
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